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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
What started out as mass protests in Libya during February 2011 escalated to a violent civil war
to force the forty-two-year old Qaddafi regime out of power. This war was extremely
destructive, both in the tangible physical sense and in the intangible psychological and social
sense. The task of reconstructing the Libyan identity seems to be nearly impossible, due to the
divisions between different sectors of society be they tribal, territorial, or political.1 It is hard to
look away from the vendetta and hatred to work collectively towards a united future. This is
magnified by the fragile Libyan institutions and distorted national identity inherited from the
Qaddafi era.
Five years have passed since the conclusion of the revolution, and the Libyans seem to
be more disunited than ever. As this research is being conducted, different militias representing
different actors and ideologies are fighting each other over the future of Libya, tearing the
society apart and causing civilian collateral damage. There is fear amongst the Libyan people
and the international community that the Libyan nation will slowly slip into a civil war if this
situation continues. It is important to understand how Libya’s post conflict reconstruction was
compromised, thus ushering in the current wave of violence, and how Libyans view this second
descent into chaos.
It is imperative to assess the reasons for this second wave of violence and determine the
roles played by the central transitional governments and the peripheral actors in the lead up to
the current Libyan situation. The voice of the Libyan people must be heard and introduced to
the academic and political discourses over the Libyan situation. It is crucial to see what the
citizens of Libya deem to be the cause of this current conflict, what entities they blame for it,
and how they envisage the way forward.

1

Sharqieh, I.( 2012).Imperatives for post-conflict reconstruction in Libya.Doha: Brookings Doha Center.
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Research Focus
Main Question: What are the major post-conflict reconstruction challenges that the transitional
period in Libya faced?
In order to answer this main question, the following questions must be answered:
a. How were Libya’s political and economic systems constructed during the Qaddafi era?

b.

i.

How were the institutions constructed?

ii.

How was the national identity defined?

What did the central transitional government define as its post-conflict reconstruction
goals?

c.

i.

To what degree was it successful?

ii.

What was its major shortcomings?

What elements of the fragile institutions and distorted national identity inherited from
the Qaddafi era challenged and impeded the post-conflict reconstruction of Libya?

Through probing this set of questions, the thesis aims to understand how the different
elements of the Qaddafi regime that were entrenched in Libyan society caused the weakening
of the post-conflict reconstruction process in Libya, and what roles were played by both state
and non-state actors. Furthermore, it aims to examine the perceptions of these roles by the
people in Libya and the means by which they can voice their demands to support or change
these roles.
Not enough focus has been given to gathering data from Libyans to understand how they
viewed the transitional period and defined the major challenges to the post-conflict
reconstruction process. What factors embedded in Libyan society during the Qaddafi era rose to
compromise the transitional period? How do they assess the performance of the National
Transitional Council (NTC) and its successor the General National Congress (GNC) in leading
4
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the transitional period and overseeing the reconstruction and reconciliation process? How did the
transitional government deal with major security issues and consolidation of security forces,
shape the political economy of the newly born nation, and deal with the tribal and regional
differences and conflicts?
Using theories of institutional reform and post-conflict reconstruction, the
thesis hypothesizes that Libya’s post-conflict reconstruction was impeded by the state of
Libya’s fragile institutions, especially the security institutions, and its weak national identity
after the revolution. These had been deconstructed by the previous regime as means to
consolidate and sustain its power. As will be discussed in more details in the thesis, nations
with hollow security institutions, a lack of previous democratic experience, and distorted and
weak national identity are more prone to fail in meeting the challenges of the post-conflict
reconstruction.2 Libya is a strong example of such a nation.
The authority of the transitional central government was consistently comprised by a
series of concessions made to peripheral actors that diminished the ability of the central
government to establish legitimacy and control over all corners of Libya.3This took place
because they lacked institutions that could propel them forward and allow them to face up to
peripheral actors who were challenging the post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. This
led to a shift of power from the center to peripheral actors, which undermined the government’s
ability to govern and caused further tension between the different competing actors on the
ground. This paved the way for the demise of the post-conflict reconstruction and the current

2

Rothchild, D., & Roeder, P. G. (2005). Dilemmas of state-building in divided societies. In D. Rothchild, &P. G. Roeder (Eds.), Sustainable

peace: power and democracy after civil wars (pp. 1-26). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
3Pack,

J., & Cook, H. (2015). The July 2012 Libyan election and the origin of post-Qadhafiappeasement. The Middle East

Journal, 69(2), 171–198.
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atrocious conflict that the nation is facing. Of course, one must recognize that a main reason for
the attempts of such peripheral actors to work outside the democratic process of reconstruction
was that Qaddafi had methodically and consistently siphoned national identity from society to
consolidate his grip over it. What it resulted in was a free-for-all competition between actors
pursuing their own self-interest over the wellbeing of Libya as a whole.
Post Conflict Reconstruction
Within this paper the process of post conflict reconstruction is not simply focused on
infrastructural development and rebuilding of war damaged areas. It is studied from a more
general view tackling the reconstruction of both the physical, political, economic, and social
aspects of the state and society. One of the most important goals of such reconstruction defined
in this research is elimination of further violent conflict after the end of the revolutionary war
which was unfortunately not met. Other goals include setting the stage for political
development and reforming previously built institutions while creating new modern ones when
needed, achieving reconciliation and mending of the torn social fabric while activating the
independent judicial branch, and ensure the state’s ability to govern and monopolize the use of
force in the nation.
Unfortunately none of these goals were achieved within the transitional period of 20122014 which motivated the creation of this research to understand the hurdels that stood in the
way of development. From the early stages of the research it was apparent that the greatest
hurdle was the state of the Libyan state inherited from the Qadaffi era or rather the lack thereof
and the continuation of this vacuum in the transitional period due to the failure of the
transitional governments to fill it. There was no Libyan state in the time of Qadaffi and the
years that followed the revoloution.

Sources and Methodology
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In an attempt to answer the questions of this research, the methodology employs a mixedmethods approach. The qualitative element is based on literature that tackles the issues of postconflict reconstruction in general and Libya’s case within it from international and domestic
sources. These secondary sources are fully documented in the bibliography. The fieldwork in
Libya is based upon in-depth interviews conducted in both Misurata and Tripoli (the safest
large cities in Libya and location of significant numbers of displaced Libyans from the east of
Libya, which is inaccessible due to security reasons) and comprises the primary resources of
the research.
First, an understanding of the legacy of the Qaddafi regime needs to be established by
studying the regime’s history, with a focus on its tools of regime sustainability. This will be
focused on the political economy of Libya under his control, which was inherited by the
transitional government; the security apparatus during his reign; and how he managed and used
the tribal system of Libya. It will be based on literature studying his time in power and will be
part of the in-depth interviews, which will be discussed below.
Secondly, there is a need for an understanding of the post-conflict reconstruction and
reconciliation that took place immediately after the conclusion of the conflict with regard to
social reforms and the engagement of different stakeholders in the reconstruction. The policies
enacted by the government and the public perception of them are studied in order to understand
their successes and shortcomings. It is important to understand how the transitional government
dealt with voices of dissent, tribal and regional powers and the revolutionary forces made up of
the different militias from the numerous regions of Libya and how the public perceived such
actions. This will be based on a study of the academic literature discussing post-Qaddafi Libya,
government publications, news reports, publications of international organizations and NGOs,
and the findings from the in-depth interviews.
Primary Sources
7
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In-depth interviews were conducted with individuals representing the government, civil society,
the military and other groups during a field visit to Tripoli and Misurata. The interviewees
were:
 Mr. Mohamed El-Gherany, previous Minister of Foreign Affairs under the GNC
government
 A member of the GNC who requested anonymity
 Mr. Mohamed Ismail, previous official spokesman of the national rescue government
and currently professor in Misurata University
 A tribal sheikh who requested anonymity
 Dr. Mohamed Fayad, Chair of the School of Economics in the University of Benghazi
and the Director of the Libyan Center for Economic and Social Research
 An advisor to the Prime Minister who requested anonymity
 Mr. Gamal Salm Elhatab, who worked in media in various institutions for thirty years
 Mr. Nagib Aly El-Greeby, Deputy Director of the National Planning Board
 A Libyan judge who requested anonymity
 Hakim Nasif, a business man
 Dr. Mohamed El-Hady, a professor in the University of Misurata who is active in civil
society
 Dr. Sharaf Eldeen Shatwan, a professor in the University of Misurata who is active in
civil society
 Dr. Khalifa Elsharkasy, a medical doctor who was active in civil society initiatives to
integrate the rebels into the national army
 Mr. Mohamed Elsweeh, an active member of civil society
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 Mr. Khalid El-Jazwy, head of economic policies in the national economic and social
development center
 Mr. Mohamed Abdelmalek, who worked in various telecommunication institutions
 Mr. Aboelqasem Abdelatty, a retired army colonel
 A Libyan lawyer and writer who requested anonymity
 A military officer who served in the army prior to the 2011 revolution, who requested
anonymity
 An employee in the Ministry of Finance, who requested anonymity.
The goal of the interviews was to receive a firsthand account of the Libyan reality postconflict with regard to the challenges facing reconstruction and reconciliation. They helped in
understanding what these actors and the entities they represent view as the causes of the rebirth
of the current conflict and their vision for post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.
The interview consisted of nine questions with varying follow up ones depending on the
expertise of the interviewees and the need for elaboration and clarifications on some topics
outside of the scope of the interview questions. In the sections of the thesis that were heavily
built on findings from the in depth interview the interview question used is added as a subtitle
of the section.The questions were:
1. In your opinion what were the major post conflict reconstruction challenges that
originated by the previous regime?
2. How was the state of the central Libyan institutions during and after the time of
Qadaffi?
3. Why was Libya unsuccessful in creating a united national army?
4. Do you believe that the presence of international security forces in Libya after the
conclusion of the 2011 conflict would have helped in the success of the transitional
period?

9

Betelmal
5. What were the major characteristics of the political process during the transitional
period?

6. How was the Libyan identity constructed in the time of Qadaffi?
7. Do you believe that there is no united identity in Libya? Why or why not?
8. If you believe in the lack of or the weakness of a national Libyan identity, do you
believe that it contributed in jeopardizing the transitional process?
9. What are the most important lessons learned from the first transitional period that must
be implemented once the current conflict is concluded?
The following chapter will discuss the literature used in this review and is concluded with
the conceptual framework. The review aims to create a theoretical understanding of the state of
the Libyan state during the Qadaffi era and in the transitional period. It is then followed by a
discussion of post conflict reconstruction challenges with the focus on the institutions and
national identity. The following chapter provides a brief look at Libya before the Qadaffi era to
assess the state's attempts of institution building a national identity creation. The fourth chapter
discuss the forty two years of the Qadaffi regime to understand what the transitional period
inherited within the focus of this research on institutions and national identity. The fifth
discusses the transitional period and how the dark legacy of the Qadaffi regime hindered the
attempts made to achieve post conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. Finally the conclusion
revisits the major findings of the research while providing policy recommendations for the
future and presents the limitations that faced this research and possible areas for future
research.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Post-conflict reconstruction in Libya was highly challenged by numerous factors inherited from
the Qaddafi era. Two major aspects of his attempts to consolidate his power and sustain his
regime came to haunt the reconstruction era, for they caused the severe weakness of the
transitional state. These aspects were the creation of fragile institutions, with a focus on the
vital security institutions as opposed to his loose brigades aimed at defending his reign rather
than protecting the nation of Libya,4 and the deconstruction of the Libyan identity to make it
revolve around him and his ideology, thus jeopardizing the possibility of Libyans having a
unified national sentiment.5 Post-conflict reconstruction literature studies these two aspects
extensively and attributes to them the re-emergence of conflict due to their destructive force
against reconstruction and reconciliation. This section addresses such literature and aims to
direct attention to areas that can be built on within it in the case of Libya.
This review will focus on those two previously mentioned aspects, with the framework
of a resource-rich personalist state emerging out of conflict, a framework of analysis that Libya
falls perfectly within.6 This aims to construct a theoretical understanding of where does Libya
fit as a state. The Qaddafi era was one in which power, wealth, and national identity were
centralized by a leader as tools of regime sustainability. Resource-rich personalist regimes are
able to do this through using the wealth of the nation, which they have complete control of, to
build a patronage system compromised of a strong crony network made up of members of their
own family, tribe, ethnicity, or region to secure their loyalty7. The Libyan state before the

4Moss,

D., & Pack, J. (2011). Libya since 1969: Qadhafi's revolution revisited. The Journal of North African Studies, 16(2),
299–311.
5Gheblawi,

G. (2011). Libyan re-independence and reclaiming the revolution.Perspectives, 2, 176–179.

6Alterman,

J. B. (2011). Seeing Through the Fog: Transitional Governments in Libya and Elsewhere. Talk given on October 6 to
Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA.
7 Ayubi, N. N. (1996). Over-stating the Arab state: Politics and society in the Middle East. IB Tauris.
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revolution falls under Ayubi’s description of Arab modern states which show great power
translated in violence against opposition which only indicates its actual weakness. Simply
because the regime had coercive strength does not mean that it constructed a strong state8.
The concentration of power and wealth within such groups and the marginalization of
others is a major cause for regional and tribal tensions post-conflict9. Scholars define such
regimes as extremely strong but tremendously vulnerable to breakdown once they are faced
with a mass opposition movement, because the crony network of business and loyalists find the
central leader unable to provide them with future resources and security and therefore abandon
him.10 Migdal set three indicators to measure the strength of state which are compliance,
participation, and legitimacy11. During the time of Qadaffi coercive power was used to achieve
certain levels of those indicators, however those indicators were not met during the transitional
period as will be discussed in details throughout the fifth chapter. The true weakness of the
state which was hidden under its vicious rule during the time of Qadaffi was inherited by the
transitional government and jeopardized the process of post conflict reconstruction.
However, reconstruction after the collapse of such regimes is mired with challenges,
since such regimes center institutions and national identity around the sustainability of the
central figure, thus causing them to be unable to function properly in a normal state.12 The
literature also suggests that nations with tribal and regional conflicts are much more prone to

8

Ibid

9Hweio,

H. (2012). Tribes in Libya: From social organization to political power. African Conflict and Peacebuilding
Review, 2(1), 111–121.
10Alterman,

Seeing Through the Fog.
Joel S. State in society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another . Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
11Migdal,

12Ibid.
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failed reconstruction due to the absence of a unified national identity.13 Thus, following the
analysis of post-conflict reconstruction by different scholars, it is simple to propose that Libya
falls within the nations that are least likely to make an immediate peaceful transition.
Post-conflict policy is a relatively new field of policy that came to the forefront of
international issues after the end of the Cold War. At first the way to undertake this study was
through scrutinizing case studies; however, a significant body of research has now emerged
based on theory and quantitative analysis.14 One of the major risks facing post-conflict
reconstruction is the recurrence of conflict, due to the fact that peace after a civil conflict is
usually fragile.15Peace becomes stronger as time passes by: the literature shows that the chance
of the rebirth of a conflict dwindles significantly with each year; thus the greatest risk exists
within the first two years.16 A major, if not the major, concern within these precarious early
years is the maintenance of security. The literature agrees that there needs to be adequate
security to fend off spoilers, protect civilians, safeguard the borders, and maintain the peace in
order to foster the reconstruction process.17 Numerous scholars support the need for
international institutional support, with a focus on security such as peacekeeping forces with
various degrees of involvement on the ground, depending on the state of the existing security

13Collier,

P., Hoeffler, A., &Söderbom, M. (2008).Post-conflict risks. Journal of Peace Research, 45(4), 461–478.

14Tschirgi,

N. (2004).Post-conflict peacebuildingrevisited.Paper prepared for Achievements, Limitations, Challenges,IPA
Peacebuilding Forum Conference, New York, 7 October.
15Collier
16

et al., Post-conflict risks.

Ibid.

17Mattes,

H. (2004). Challenges to security sector governance in the Middle East: The Libyan case. Paper presented at
the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces conference,Challenges of Security Sector Reform in the
Middle East,Geneva, Switzerland, July.

13

Betelmal
institutions such as the armed forces and the police.18 However, this argument was highly
debated in the case of Libya’s post-conflict reconstruction.
One camp argued that it was imperative for NATO to remain active in Libya after the
death of Qaddafi until there was a central Libyan army that was able to safeguard the
democratic process.19 It argued that the alliance between the different militias was based on
animosity against Qaddafi rather than a similar vision for the future of Libya and that once
Qaddafi was history old animosities between tribes and regions would re-emerge to threaten
peace and security. Thus an international presence would be important to maintain peace and
stop aggression, secure the borders, facilitate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration,
and train the new national army.20 The other camp argued that the Qaddafi propaganda had
portrayed the NATO intervention as a foreign invasion; extending their mission would thus
ignite Qaddafi royalist propaganda, compromise the image of the transitional government, and
fuel anti-western sentiment.21Interesting questions that were tackled in the interviews was
whether, in light of the current events in Libya, Libyans felt that an international security
presence could have averted the current conflict and whether they see such a presence as a
viable option after the conclusion of this current conflict.
Security institutions are, as stated earlier, extremely important for post-conflict
reconstruction but they are not the only important ones. In order for this process to be
successful, there must be a legal system in charge of transitional justice, a functional

18Chivvis,

C. S., Crane, K., Mandaville, P., & Martini, J. (2012). Libya’s post-Qaddafi transition: The nation-building
challenge. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation;Orr, R. C. (Ed.). (2011). Winning the peace: An American strategy for postconflict reconstruction (Vol. 26). Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
19Ibid.
20Rand,

C. D. (2013). Intervention in Libya: Resistance and co-option in the emerging hegemony (Doctoral
dissertation);Sharqieh, I. (2011, March 2). Even a weakened Libya can avoid civil war.The Financial Times.
21Ibid.
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bureaucracy, and economic and other institutions.22 However, the focus of this thesis is mainly
on the security institutions, because without them the other institutions would not be able to
achieve their respective objectives,23 and most importantly their collective objective to
construct a national identity. The nature of the relationship between institutions, especially
security institutions, and national identity is ironic; you cannot have one without the other, and,
at the same time, each one is a prerequisite for the other.24
The identity of a nation is shaped through the shared experience of its citizens, which
defines them as united entity.25 It is not simply about coming together, but rather a coming
together in a regulated, stable, and sustained way. It is something that has to be systematic and
constant; it basically has to be institutionalized.26 When it comes to shared experience, scholars
define a conflict for liberation or self-determination as the most powerful of
experiences.27Some writers believe that, as opposed to numerous other Middle Eastern
countries, Libya did not build a strong national identity through anti-colonial resistance. Libya
did not have such a struggle for it did not achieve its independence from Italy through
resistance but rather due to the latter’s defeat in the Second World War.28Another view of
Libya’s identity argues that the resistance to Italy was the first collective action by Libyans
across the regions and tribal backgrounds, and the difficult process of achieving independence

22Chivvis

et al. Libya’s Post-Qaddafi Transition.

23Ibid.
24Alterman,

Seeing Through the Fog.

25Bruner,

M. L. (2002). Strategies of remembrance: The rhetorical dimensions of national identity construction. Columbia, CA:
University of South Carolina Press.
26

Ibid.

27Cerulo,

K. A. (1997). Identity construction: New issues, new directions. Annual Review of Sociology, 385–409.

28Anderson,

L. (1986). Religion and state in Libya: The politics of identity. The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, 483(1), 61–72.
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from the UN fostered and built on such collective action. The road to independence was long
and difficult, for it was based on numerous challenging conditions that galvanized Libyans to
come together. This process will be discussed in detail in the following chapter to demonstrate
the points made by this side of the argument. The literature disagrees on whether a national
united identity for Libya was ever created; however, there is an agreement that the artificial
identity Qaddafi attempted to impose only survived due to his vicious security apparatus.29 Not
only did he impose his own identity and ideology upon the Libyans but he used a malicious
strategy of divide and conquer. He made the task of constructing a national identity more
improbable by giving wealth and power to those who supported him, be it tribes or regions, and
marginalizing the rest, causing feud and grievance to take place between the different entities
of Libyan society. Moreover, he politicized the tribes.30 The literature attributes the lack of
unity in Libyan society to the history of disunity before him and to his reign, which distorted
whatever little national identity the Libyans had.31 Post-conflict reconstruction discourse
attributes the lack of a uniform national identity as one of the major risks for post-conflict
scenario and, as seen on the ground, this risk was translated into a gruesome reality, a reality
that the politicized Libyan tribal society played an important role in.32
The discourse on tribes following a conflict includes some major debates. Some
scholars argue that tribes can be used as building blocks for the post-conflict reconstruction33

29Ibid.
30Anderson,

L. (2014). The state and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1820–1980. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
31Ibid.
32Hweio,

Tribes in Libya.

33Sharqieh,I.(2013).

Reconstructing Libyan stability through national reconciliation, Doha: Brookings Doha Center;
Cherstich, I. (2014). When tribesmen do not act tribal: Libyan tribalism as ideology (not as schizophrenia). Middle East
Critique, 23(4), 405–421.
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while others deem them as a destructive force in the process.34 The first group argues that tribes
have the ability to fill the void in civil society and local institutions by being able to reach the
people directly until the newly founded state can build up local institutions that can do so. They
can mobilize their members into developmental actions, raise awareness and fight for their right
to be included in the political and developmental process. The literature attributes the increase
in the strength of tribes after 2011 to the filling of the void left by the weak central government.
Tribalism is not opposed to national sentiment but rather a dynamic language that is
harmonious with it if utilized correctly.
Other scholars consider tribes as damaging to the democratic process, especially
because of the ties between tribes and militias, and see them as maintaining the old feuds
between them. They see that the rise in their power is due to their desire to carve out their own
place in the future of Libya by over politicizing themselves and using military force to establish
dominance. They cite numerous occasions when militias coerced the transitional government
into changing laws and enacting policies.35 Such instances will be further discussed in this
thesis. The fieldwork assessed how Libyans see the rise of tribal politics and militarization. Do
they see it as self-defense and filling the void of the weak central government or as a
methodological attempt to gain power and influence over the government?

Conclusion: A Conceptual Framework
The literature was divided over the nature of constructing national security forces after conflict
between emphasizing the importance of having international peacekeeping forces to maintain
the peace and provide security and deeming such forces as impractical and destructive in Libya.

34

Pack, & Cook.The July 2012 Libyan election; Van Genugten, S. (2011). Libya after Gadhafi. Survival, 53(3), 61–74.

35Wehrey,

F. (2012). Libya’s Militia Menace. Foreign Affairs.Retrieved [insert date], from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2012-07-12/libyas-militia-menace.
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All of the interviewees belonged to the second camp, because the introduction of such forces
was going to be viewed as undesired foreign intervention against Libyan sovereignty. It would
compromise peace rather than enable it, and pro-Qaddafi propaganda would have used it as a
means to ruin the image of the Libyan revolution. The question that arises is how to maintain
peace after a conflict in a segmented Libya, a question that must be answered to avoid future
conflicts. A major part of the thesis will address this question, using the history of Libya before
and after the revolution alongside post-conflict reconstruction security sector reform theories to
answer it, and will, it is hoped, provide an important addition to the existing body of literature
on the topic.
The second major issue tackled in the research is national identity. The thesis proposes
that the lack of such identity opened the door for spoilers and competing peripheral tribal actors
to challenge post-conflict reconstruction, which ushered in the current crisis. Some scholars
argue that it was the weakness of the new central authority that gave birth to the rise in tribal
power as a form of self-defense, designed to provide security for their members. Others argue
that the politicizing of the tribes during the Qaddafi era is the reason and that they wish to
operate as spoilers in order to ensure their sovereignty over their areas. The findings of this
research supports ideas proposed by both camps but is in more support of the first one. It traces
the emergence of tribal politics during the time of the monarchy, Jamahirya, and the
transitional period of 2012 to 2014. Throughout those years the periods of least tribal influence
were towards the end of the monarchy and beginning of the Jamahirya when a central state was
present. When a state was present and able to provide social and material security for its people
the tribal forces lost ground. However the second camp cannot be completely dismissed for the
distorted Libyan identity, alongside the politicizing of the tribes during the previous era, aided
in casing their rise in power as spoilers to the democratic process whether to achieve personal
goals or the goals of powerful actors mobilizing the tribes for the actors’ gains. In the
18
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conclusion this research argues that the tribal factor can be capitalized on in post-conflict
reconstruction if used well. The have to be depoliticized and used as agents for development in
civil society, as they have access to local areas that the central government does not. The tribal
system can be viewed as a curse hindering development, but they are a curse that is not
removable from society. However, they can be turned into a blessing if handled well, a blessing
that can induce community-based post-conflict reconstruction that fosters the inclusion of the
marginalized, whose voices are not otherwise able to reach central government.

19

Betelmal

CHAPTER III: A BRIEF LOOK AT LIBYA’S HISTORY
This chapter will discuss Libya on the eve of independence from Italy and its successful
struggle to gain statehood. The Libyan reality was dire, and the future was uncertain because it
faced numerous hurdles as an independent country. The economy was in a shambles, human
capital was weak, hardly any institutions were functioning, and tribal leaders had tremendous
influence since they had been the only unifying factors during Libya’s long history of
occupation by numerous forces throughout the years.36 However, Libyans banded together in
nationalistic zeal and managed to create a united state with functional institutions. It was
through such striving and state-building that the national identity of Libya was born. According
to Samuel Huntington, institutions are repeated patterns of behavior that can create nationalistic
ideals that citizens can unite under.37 The main reason behind the reliance on tribal leaders
before the state was formed was the lack of such institutions. The struggle for independence
from Italy built the foundations for a national identity, and the state was created on those
foundations.38

36

Al-Bashir, Ali Alkot.(2012). Libya: identity, tyranny, and revolution.National Libyan Library ( in Arabic only).

37

Huntigton, S. P. (2006).Political order in changing societies.New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

38

Al-Bashir, Libya.
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Economic indicators at the end of the 1940s were not at all encouraging for Libya’s
ability to become an independent stable nation, because the country lacked human and natural
resources. At this critical hour in its history, Libya was one of the poorest nations of the world,
which posed tremendous challenges for state-building, and there was a constant fear that its
weakness and lack of resources would make it vulnerable to occupation and to famine.39
Only 10 percent of its population was literate and only 5,000 had received education
to fifth grade. There were also only 14 university graduates, who had mostly received religious
education in Al-Azhar University in Egypt. Eighty-seven percent of Libyans worked in
agriculture; administrative or managerial expertise was almost non-existent, because the Italian
occupation did not allow Libyans to have such jobs and did not allow education beyond the
fifth grade.40 In an economic study conducted by the United Nations in 1952,the first year of
independence, it was stated that Libya was a prime example of extreme poverty, there was a
lack of resources and energy, agricultural expansion was limited due to the harsh climate, and
there was no trained labor force or national contractors.41
Given the human capital of Libya, it seemed almost impossible to build a state with
such an underdeveloped labor force. The Italian occupation had limited access to education:
there were only 10,000 Libyan students in schools in 1939.42 By the time the occupation was
over, there was no institution in charge of managing education or even a Libyan curriculum.
The United Kingdom, which controlled Tripoli and Benghazi, imported the Egyptian
curriculum to these areas, and France imported the Tunisian one for Fazan in the south.43 In
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order for Libya to achieve stability and welfare, it needed human resources capable of
managing the state and constructing the highly necessary institutions, and those were in
extremely short supply.
The state of natural resources and economic capabilities were just as dire. Ninety
percent of the land is desert, which halted the development of agriculture and what exacerbated
the grim situation was the unavailability of fresh water and the lack of rainfall, which is mostly
concentrated on the coast of Libya. Despite that, agricultural production was 93 percent of
Libya’s limited production due to the shortage of other sources of income. In spite of its low
population of around one million citizens at that time, the GDP per capita was $30 a year in
1949.44
After Italy's defeat in World War Two, the management of its previous colonies was
transferred to the UN General Assembly. Those nations were obliged to follow such
management and, in the case of Libya, this ushered in a struggle to achieve independence and
establish a Libyan nation. After a series of discussions and studies of the desire of the people of
Libya that were delivered by various prominent members of the three Libyan regions, the
General Assembly devised a road map towards Libya’s independence and sovereignty. The
resolution was approved on November 21, 1949; however, it recognized that independence
cannot exist without three prerequisites, which were the creation of a constitution, agreement
on the form of the administration, and agreement on the form of government. If those
prerequisites were not met by January 1, 1952, the resolution would be annulled and Libya
would remain under the mandate of the General Assembly.45 In order to meet the challenging
task of establishing the Libyan state, the staterepresentatives from the three Libyan regions
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came together and created the national coalition, also known as the Libyan constituent
assembly, to construct the three pillars demanded for the Libyan state. They worked hand in
hand with the representative of the United Nations Mr. Adrian Belt and an advisory board
consisting of ten members made up of various nationalities.46
After months of rigorous discussions and studies, it was decided that Libya would be
a federal state in order to unite the three regions while maintaining a certain level of
independence for each.47 The federal state was to become a monarchy ruled by King
Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi as-Senussi. With the first two conditions met, Libyans raced to
finish the final one and establish a constitution on which to build the political, social, economic,
and legal administration of the state. After much heated debate, numerous meetings, and
assistance from international legal experts, the constitution was created and published on
November 6, 1951. On December 24, 1951, Libya’s independence was declared, ending a
struggle that had shaped the Libyan identity and existence through the people uniting to end the
occupation and build a modern state of law and order to call their own.48 It was a long and
difficult process, and there were many challenges that almost destroyed the long-awaited
independence, which are too numerous to outline and lie outside the scope of this research.
Nevertheless, the Libyan people managed to come together and work through their differences
to find the middle ground that united them as one nation.

Institution Building and Identity Consolidation
From its inception, the newly born nation faced tremendous challenges that jeopardized its
independence and survival. The war had destroyed so much of its already modest
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infrastructure. Economically, Libya was in a shambles for it was one of the poorest nations in
the world on the eve of its independence. Building institutions that could develop the nation’s
infrastructure, achieve self-sufficiency, create social justice, protect its borders, foster the
newly born national identity, and maintain political stability would prove to be a challenge far
greater than the struggle for independence.
The first government under the leadership of Mr. Mohamed Al-Montasser attempted
to find ways to fund Libya’s development from within the nation, but the search was futile
because Libya lacked natural resources and basic industry, and even agriculture was in a
dreadful situation due to the lack of proper irrigation systems and basic infrastructure. The
Italian occupation had not cared about developing Libya’s economy, infrastructure, or
education, causing the dismal state of the country after independence.49Unable to meet its
economic need to fund the tremendous tasks ahead of it, Libya turned to the international
community and formed a treaty of friendship with the UK that attempted to gain the greatest
amount of financial aid in return for the least possible amount of restrictions and conditions.
After long negotiations, the treaty was signed and the funding it provided was the only foreign
source of income in the early years of Libyan independence. In return for that aid, the UK
received the right to create a military base on Libyan soil.50
March 25, 1952 was a date of equivalent importance to Libya’s Independence Day
because it marked the first session of the first elected Libyan parliament. It was a huge step
towards achieving the full legitimacy of Libya’s independence. Libyans were overjoyed and the
elusive and difficult dream of establishing an independent state was finally realized.51 Now, the
parliament and government started working hand in hand to establish state institutions. Due to
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the lack of well-developed human capital, as was explained earlier, the help of friendly nations
such as Egypt, the United States and the UK, was enlisted in order to build institutions. Their
greatest areas of focus were building the legal framework and administrative frameworks for
such institutions alongside improvement in education and training.52
A team of some of the greatest legal minds of Egypt aided the newly made parliament
in the creation of legislation that would foster the newly built institutions and maximize
efficiency. Legislation focusing on education, financial affairs, health, agriculture, labor,
transportation and other subjects was created within the first few weeks. They took the place of
the oppressive Italian laws and clearly set the structure of the newly founded nation.53
Driven by patriotic momentum due to the numerous national achievements taking
place against all odds, the parliament and government worked tirelessly to set the foundations
of state institutions based on the newly created legislation. Each body performed its duties
within the roles provided for each under the constitution and the legislation establishing the
state. The government conducted its executive tasks, despite the difficulties it faced from the
lack of resources and the federal system that limited its central power. The parliament
supervised the work of the government in its policies and decisions and practiced its
constitutional right of supervision and legislative support diligently. This coordination and
mutual respect was caused by the creation of the constitution that informed the different
governmental institutions, political parties, and civil society of their rights and obligations and
ensured the independence of the judicial branch.54 Despite the limited resources, the national
powers came together to build the state institutions. This was not the case after the 2011
revolution, for the parliament and government started their functions before a constitution was
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created and it still does not exist in the political structure of Libya to this very day, five years
after the revolution.55 One of the main arguments of this research is that one of the major
hurdles that faced the revolution and exacerbated other hurdles was the rush for a parliament
and government before the constitution and national security institutions. This will be visited in
more detail in the upcoming chapters.
To conclude, Libya under the monarchy was truly a constitutional system; the
government had a clear separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. The judicial branch had full independence from the influence of the other branches
and even the king himself; there were no exceptional courts or detention centers for opposition
members, for it was a nation of rights and law. Each prisoner was granted fair legal
representation and visitation rights in addition to humane treatment. Despite the presence of
political opposition and even attempted coups there were no executions for political reasons.
The only incident of such punishment during the eighteen years of the monarchy was upon a
person who committed a murder for political reasons.56
If one takes a close look at the history of the Libyan state during those eighteen years
and compares it to its counterparts in the Middle East during that period, one will conclude that
it was more democratic and constitutional than the majority of the rest. It was a nation of laws
and rights, with limited corruption and widespread intellectual and political freedoms. It
managed to unite its citizens under its institutions, which set the basis for national identity and
pride in one’s nation. The tribal system still played a role throughout those years, but its power
and influence was diminishing significantly due to the rise in education, urbanization, and state
institutions, which were able to serve the people, thus decreasing their need for tribal
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leadership. Towards the end of the monarchy, the tribal system was becoming more and more a
social and cultural actor rather than a political one.57
The next chapter will discuss in detail how all of this hard work was undone in a
systematic manner during the forty-two years that followed the Qaddafi coup. State institutions
and especially the security ones were diminished and in their place bodies aiming to maintain
the regime’s authority rather than serve the population were established. The strong Libyan
identity that many scholars deem as non-existent 58was distorted to establish Qaddafi and his
ideals as its center and beating heart. However, such identity did exist and was powerful during
the time of the monarchy as discussed earlier; its re-emergence and proof of its existence is
discussed in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER IV: THE DARK LEGACY OF THE QADDAFI ERA
Understanding the legacy of the Qaddafi regime on Libya throughout its four decades in power
is a tremendous task. Forming an image of how such a dark legacy was constructed and its
effects on Libya before and after the 2011 revolution requires years of research, due to both its
infiltration of all aspects of society and the lack of a comprehensive body of literature on this
period. This legacy is looked at from two specific angles in this thesis: the development or lack
thereof of institutions, and the distortion of national identity. The thesis’s main proposal is that
these two aspects of the Qaddafi era hindered the post-conflict reconstruction efforts, with a
focus on the period 2012–2014 and the reemergence of conflict, and this chapter traces these
two aspects prior to the revolution.
As discussed earlier in the previous chapter, a strong national identity was born from a
united fight for liberation and was then fostered by the state institutions that rallied people
behind them by setting goals and serving citizens’ needs. The first condition was met in the
time of the kingdom and in the 2011 revolution; however, the second condition was only met
after the independence of 1951, and not after the revolution of 2011. The transitional
government could not meet the second condition,because of the Qaddafi legacy, which is
discussed in this chapter.
This conclusion was based on the rapid development of inner conflict and divisions
within Libyan society soon after the fall of the previous regime and the failure of the
transitional government to deal with such division,because it had inherited weak and corrupt
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institutions unable to enact change. There was also a weak national identity that was distorted
by those institutions, and such distortion continued after the fall of Qaddafi because those
institutions and the divisive mentality that he inflicted on the nation carried on. Many actions
by the central government and peripheral actors resemble to a dangerous degree the actions of
the Qaddafi regime. It is true that the man in power fell because of the revolution, but his rules
of the game remained and the different peripheral actors aiming to maximize their power and
control played according to those rules.
Institutions
1. How was the state of the central Libyan institutions?

After the ousting of the king in 1969 and the suspension of the constitution, the stage was set
for Qaddafi and his inner circle to shape Libya’s institutions as they saw fit, with no legal
supervision for they had uncontested revolutionary legitimacy.59 This transformation of
institutions was not done in a consistent manner, but was ever changing during the Qaddafi era,
depending on the needs of the regime, not the people, and the whims of the leader.60 However,
three factors remained constant throughout the forty-two years. The revolutionary leadership
could not be questioned or dismissed or elected, because it derived its existence from its
revolutionary legitimacy. Political parties and party pluralism were rejected in all shapes and
forms. A very famous slogan of Qaddafi, which was on billboards and school walls all over
Libya was man tahazab khan, which roughly translates as being in a party is equivalent to
treason. This slogan and way of thinking will be visited in the following chapter when
discussing the political process after the success of the revolution. Finally, elections in the
traditional sense followed in democratic nations were forbidden, and in its place, to ensure
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direct democracy, representatives with a mandate from the Jamahir (masses) were elected by
tas'id (vote). They were elected in their areas to create local Basic People’s Congresses, which
then formed the General People’s Congress, which represented all of Libya as its direct
democratic institution.61
True decision making in Libya was monopolized by its ruling class, which was made up
of the revolutionary leadership (qiyadat al-thawra) and the revolutionary committees (al-lijan
al-thawriah). At the top of this off course resided Qaddafi and his sons once they became
adults, especially Seif El-Islam al-Qaddafi who was being groomed to take over the
revolutionary power.62 The revolutionary leadership was made up of the former members of the
Revolutionary Command Council that were still in office. The revolutionary committees were
spread out throughout Libya, and their official mandate was to protect the “rule of the people”
and the revolution. They had great political influence and represented the ever-watching eyes,
ever-listening ears, and ever-powerful arms of the regime in their communities. They
maintained control on behalf of the revolutionary leadership and were a key instrument in
mobilizing the masses in marches and activities that supported the regime. They answered to no
one but Qaddafi, and the only criterion needed to join was absolute loyalty. They existed
outside the legal framework and held key positions within the governmental institutions in their
cities. In fact, a great number of their members joined because their membership would open
the door to promotions and fellowships to study abroad.63Due to the lack of data on them, their
exact numbers are unknown but they were estimated to be around 60,000 in 2002 by Dr.
Muhammad Khalfallah.64
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Libya’s direct democracy was built on three pillars: the local basic people’s congresses,
the professional congresses, and the people’s committees (the executive branch). All of these
pillars worked under the control of the General People’s Congress, which met to transform
local resolutions into national laws and to nominate the members of the national executive
branch equivalent, the general people’s committees.65This system was the embodiment of
Qaddafi’s vision of direct democracy, and was meant to be a model to be taught and exported
to the outside world to counter the democratic capitalistic systems of the west, which were
severely criticized by Qaddafi in his theories and speeches. However, in reality this
complicated and convoluted system was nothing but an act, because no decisions or
appointments could be made without the approval of the revolutionary leadership and the
leadership had the right to veto any decision that they had passed if they changed their minds.
The truth of the matter was that this network of elected representatives was more or less a
scapegoat for Qaddafi to blame any failures on, and the Chad war was a prime example of
that.66 At the end of the day, there was nothing direct or democratic in this system, but above
all, there were no regulations, supervision, or accountability.67
Structure or lack thereof
After reviewing the existing literature on Libya and conducting in-depth interviews with
individuals who worked in Libyan institutions before and after the revolution, a clearer picture
of the horrendous state of the Libyan institutions inherited from the Qaddafi era emerged. All
of the interviewees agreed that there were no institutions in Libya in the traditional sense, but
rather tools for regime sustainability and protection, and they were very successful in that task
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for forty-two years. They did not collect data or information and were not functioning for the
sake of the nation but rather to preserve the regime.68In theory such institutions were meant to
be the drivers of development, but the reality was the opposite. Also there was no coordination
between them or an overarching vision for Libya's development. They were fragile, filled with
corruption and nepotism. None of the economic, health, education, or security institutions were
functional in the traditional sense.69 Even the cultural institutions were more focused on
preserving Qaddafi’s legacy and ideas than Libyan culture and values; their main mandate was
to create propaganda on his accomplishments and his political theories and systems. Libyan
history was modified in curriculums and Libyan literature to paint a false image of the
monarchy and show the coup as a true act of heroism.70As discussed earlier, national effort is a
major way of building identity; he systematically made the coup the collective effort of the
nation, while marginalizing the efforts for independence and previous state building.
The legal procedures were more or less designed to create a disfunctional system;not
only did theyallow corruption but they were corruption-inducing and anti-production. Looking
back at the procedures required within an institution, the interviewees unanimously described
archaic, complicated, bureaucratic, labyrinth-like procedures that were easily manipulated
through corruption. Because they were multilayered and convoluted, there was corruption on
every level “as if the system is demanding corruption,”71 said Mr. Hakim. According to him,
the system did not condemn employees for not taking a decision or for not doing their jobs but
was harsh on those who made decisions. If someone from within an institution wanted to
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reform or attempt to bypass the crippling bureaucracy in order to be productive, he/she would
actually be accused and accountable, thus criminalizing the reformer.72

Masked Unemployment
A critical point that was discussed by numerous interviewees who worked within public Libyan
institutions was that many institutions didnot have proper staffing structure regulations
todetermine the positionsneeded and the qualifications required for each.Also,a proper job
description was almost non-existent for the majority of jobs, thus causing confusion within
departments; even if they did exist, there would not be clear critieria for who should have the
job.73 Therefore numerous people were hired for important or even critical jobs that do not
meet the proper educational or professional requirements for them. A department in an
institution that may only need ten people might have over thirty, which hinders productivity if
not destroys it completely. This adds a huge burden to the budget of the state, because a great
proportion of its income is going into salaries for unproductive employees, who are not only
hindering productivity through adding nothing, but contributing negatively. Another
frightening side-effect of the lack of proper staffing procedures and regulations is that one
person can be working in two, three or more public jobs and getting paid for all of them
without actually contributing in any.74
According to the Libyan Audit Bureau’s report in 2014, salaries are the greatest
challenge to the national budget, since they consume up to 50 percent of it without adding
value to the state or increasing productivity by much. This puts a tremendous stress and burden
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on the state and hinders its ability to achieve developmental goals. The government inherited
these inflated and dysfunctional institutions, which are holding back the process of reform and
reconstruction, from the previous regime. This is a major challenge for the transitional period
because one of the major reasons for the frustration and dissension in the Libyan streets is the
lack of development and change after the conclusion of the war.
A major question here is why Libyan institutions suffer from such masked
unemployment and inflated staff. After Libya’s independence, King Idris started building
proper state institutions based on western training and capacity building. The staff were highly
trained, limited in numbers and well compensated. There was also great encouragement for the
private sector, and it was starting to grow slowly and steadily,75 After the Qaddafi coup in
1969, this system started to change, as he moved towards socialism. There was an attack on the
private sector, coupled with over hiring in the public sector. The majority of businesses were
nationalized, including small stores where the owners would go to sleep as owners and wake up
as public employees in their own business, getting a government salary instead of profits. There
was an overexpansion in public employment and major obstacles for private ventures: the state
became in charge of all income and resources. According to Mr. Mohamed Sweeh, this was
done to limit access to capital to the public and consolidate wealth within the regime and its
cronies. It was also to make the regime seem to be the source of life and prosperity, in order to
buy loyalty and make life without it seem impossible.
Armed Forces
Why was Libya unsuccessful in creating a united national army after the revolution?
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Following the coup of 1969, Qaddafi and the revolutionary leadership created special
security institutions that do not have equivalents in other countries to safeguard the regime.
Such institutions worked outside regular legal and supervisory processes. Even the exact
numbers and identities of its members are not known and neither are their exact mandates.76
The power and influence of such institutions changed throughout the years, depending on the
whims of the revolutionary leadership; thus, there was competition between them and lack of
coordination.77 Further research on such institutions can be quite educational; however it is
difficult due to the lack of information. This research focuses on the armed forces as an
example, to understand the effect that its condition during the Qaddafi era had on the attempts
of the transitional governments to create a united army after the revolution.
At the beginning of the Qaddafi era, the armed forces received great attention from the
government, and the budget for armaments and number of conscripts increased greatly.
Between 1973 and 1983, around 28 billion dollars was spent on upgrading and increasing the
military equipment of the state, buying from the Soviet Union.78 The highest number of
it had was 86,000 in 1982.79 Both the numbers and spending decreased following the end of the
Chad intervention, as the regime relied more and more on parallel institutions for its protection.
The army started to be turned into a hollow, empty, badly funded institution from the late 1990s
onwards, as the Qaddafi militias gained more power and significance.80 This weakening and
destruction of the national armed forces was not an abrupt action, but rather a systematic plan
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that took place over the years. The interviewees who had served in the army gave interesting
insights on this transformation, its motives and procedures.
The Ministry of Defense only lasted for three months after the coup of 1969. The
revolutionary leadership disbanded it, after the involvement of the Minister of Defense Colonel
Adam al-Hawwazz in an attempted coup.81 This caused the creation of the Law to Protect the
Revolution and to Qaddafi giving himself the duties of Prime Minister. Now Qaddafi had
assumed all three core positions in the Libyan government, for he became the Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council, Chairman of the Ministerial Council, and the Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces. With the absence of a constitution, he had freedom to shape the
Libyan institutions and especially the security institutions as he saw fit, with no regulation or
supervision whatsoever.
Leadership of the different branches of the armed forces and key positions in the state
circulated between members of the Revolutionary Command and Qaddafi’s trusted, loyal
followers. The leadership and influence of an individual was no longer simply defined by rank
and service record; tribal membership and unwavering loyalty to Qaddafi rather than to Libya
became the sources of influence in the army, thus causing a distortion of command and
inefficiency.82 The general training and development of soldiers was weakened and there was
lack of coordination and sometime unhealthy competition and sabotage between the different
leaders.
The circles of influence and leadership in the armed forces consisted of blood relatives
of Qaddafi, in-laws of the Qaddafi family, members of Qaddafi’s tribe, and members of allied
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tribes of Qaddafi’s tribe. Tribalization of the army and favoring loyalty over ability was
undeniably clear. A major side effect of this dangerous restructuring of the military was the
high levels of corruption among the high-ranking officers in the deals conducted for
armaments, which had no civilian or legal supervision.83
As loyalty and tribal connections became the key ingredients for promotions and
advancement within a military career, a systematic process of weeding out patriotic or nonrevolutionary zealous officers out of their positions in the army was initiated. Such officers
would suffer from decreases and halts in their salaries for months, and the sight of a military
officer working in a second job to support his family became common.84In addition, dismissal,
forced retirement, imprisonment, and assassination happened to such officers if they spoke too
loudly against the rapid corruption within the institution and the country in general.
Promotions, training, and capacity building were limited to those in the loyal spheres of tribal
influence, thus causing the general level of competency to decline.85
There were genuine attempts to force officers who did not follow the desired model to
quit. The examinations needed for promotion were quite demeaning, because all officers
regardless of rank would take the same examination: an examination that covered not military
knowledge or expertise but rather Qaddafi’s theories. One of the officers interviewed cited
ridiculous questions, such as who the greatest leader of the world is.86
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The image of the armed forces and security institutions in general was transformed over
the years from the guardians of the state to the violent arms of the regime.87 Members of such
institutions were viewed as corrupt and violent people, and the institutions as a whole were
seen as brainwashing machines. Many of the interviewees discussed the various methods used
to get themselves or their loved ones out of military conscription, such as paying bribes, faking
medical records, and fleeing the country. This institution that is a major driving force for
identity projection and national unity became something sinister as whole and tainted the
reputation of those who joined.
Libyan writers and the majority of the interviewees strongly believed that Qaddafi's
attempt to distort the armed forces and turn its loyalty to him rather than the state was in order
to avoid tasting his own poison in a coup. However, by restructuring the army into the image he
desired he ended up deconstructing and destroying its capabilities.88It became an army of
generals, in which the hierarchal pyramid was turned upside down due to the lack of structure
and regulations for promotions. More officers were in the higher ranks than in the lower ranks
causing great inefficiency, which was a main reason for the crushing defeat of the Libyan
forces in the Chad intervention.89
Despite all of his efforts to tame the army, members of it attempted coups against him
in 1970, 1975, and 1993.90 This strengthened his attempts to weaken and destroy it as an
institution. One theory that was dismissed at the onset of the research due to its extreme gravity
and inability to be confirmed is discussed here because of the tremendous support it has had
from Libyan thinkers and the majority of the interviewees. It states that one of the main reasons
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for the intervention in Chad was to destroy the backbone of the military and set the stage for
Qaddafi’s militias, who were dominant until the revolution and were the ones who defended
him during it. It is quite interesting that such a theory is widely believed and supported by
Libyan society; whether it is true or not is not the point here. The point is that his actions to
destroy the army throughout his time in power left a mark on Libyan society to the extent that
such an outlandish theory could be taken as truth by large segments of society.
As the family grew and the sons came into their own, Qaddafi systematically
dismantled the army, while creating parallel militias and started to appoint his sons and family
members to be in charge of his new militia in one way or another. Their mission was to secure
the system and safeguard Qaddafi’s Libya. Their members were from Qaddafi’s tribe and
strongly allied tribes;91 however, authoritative numbers of such members are not known, due to
the lack of records. The idea of an army with rules and systems which projects a sense of a
national identity was being destroyed step by step throughout his years in power, and it was left
as an empty, hollow skeleton. By the eve of the revolution, the army was a weak collection of
poorly trained soldiers and officers, with obsolete weapons and equipment. Many of them
joined the revolution, trained the rebels and helped give the rebel forces structure and
leadership.
Identity
Throughout his time in power, Qaddafi attempted to shape Libya’s identity and the
national ethos. His changes were not consistent, and he flirted with numerous ideas and
frameworks, starting with Pan-Arabism and moving on to socialism, tribalism, African unity,
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and others.92 Throughout the forty-two years that followed the coup, he was trying to spread an
ideology and rejecting others vehemently. International or national interests would then push
him towards the opposite, dragging the Libyan citizen along on this ideological rollercoaster.93
However throughout all of this ideological pandemonium one thing remained constant:
Qaddafi’s image as the eternal leader and his political theories presented in the Green Book
were the center of Libya’s national ideology.94
Many institutions, if one may call them that, were erected, such as the Center of Green
Book Studies and others, to spread his ideas and imprint them on Libyan society.95 Traditional
institutions such as state media and education were transformed into a propaganda apparatus,
attempting to mold the Libyan reality as he saw fit. No media outlets or newspapers were
operational, other than the state-run ones, which functioned primarily to glorify him and his
policies. An interviewee who worked in the media jokingly discussed how the state-run channel
was more or less Qaddafi’s video diary, detailing his activities throughout the day and even the
phone calls he gets, depicting him as the wise, ever-working groundbreaker making Libya the
leader of the international world order. This was coupled with extensive criticism of his
international counterparts and how they are destroying freedoms all over the world, and
presentation of the jealousy the world has of Libya’s direct democracy and rule of the masses.96
As for education, the teaching of foreign languages was banned in schools for the first
years after the coup. Numerous vital subjects received little attention, and their significance
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was overtaken by new subjects focusing on Qaddafi’s political theories and his revolutionary
history.97 History of the outside world was distorted to put his Libya at the forefront of it. The
history of Libya before him was altered to show the monarchy as a dark period of corruption
and weakness. Even the history of the Libyan struggle was changed to create false heroes of his
family and tribe and create an image of his father as a key leading figure in the fight for
independence.98
The utter state control over the citizens’ sources of news and knowledge aimed to create
a national identity that defined nationalism as loyalty to Qaddafi and his ideas. This spread into
all aspects of Libyan institutions, as discussed earlier, where the mere notion of employment
and advancement was tied to loyalty and support.99 However, the Libyan population rejected
such a distorted, forced pseudo-identity, even if they claimed they did not out of fear. The poor
state of the economy, despite Libya’s resources, the blatant, visible corruption, and the
tremendous oppression of freedoms through imprisonment, public executions, and
assassination of opposition members abroad caused Libyans to see the ugly truth behind the
image he tried to portray.100 He was seen more as a foreign occupier than the leader of the
nation. Instead of creating a national identity embedded with the ideas of citizenship, he
divided Libyans, for they turned to other methods of self-identification such as tribes, cities,
and religions instead of Libyan nationalism.101
Tribalism
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How was the Libyan identity constructed in the time of Qadaffi?
The regime’s view of and interactions with Libyan tribes followed its characteristics of
volatility and idiosyncrasy. The regime attempted to diminish whatever was left of the tribal
political presence from 1969 to 1979. The state rhetoric was that tribes were not compatible
with the leader’s vision of the unified Jamahiriya and its system of direct democracy and
participation. Researchers argue that this could have been caused by his desire to eliminate any
players on the Libyan scene that could compromise his legitimacy and attract people’s
loyalty.102 A Libyan argument on this matter is that his main reason was his sense of inferiority,
for his tribe was one of the weakest and poorest tribes of Libya.103 He systematically removed
tribal leaders or members of tribes associated with the monarchy and replaced them with
revolutionary individuals loyal to the Jamahiriya. Not surprisingly, such individuals were
members of his tribe or allied tribes.104 He consciously stated that Libya was one “big tribe;”
however, his definition of such a tribe appeared to be his own tribe only.
The rules of the game changed once international sanctions were imposed on Libya,
because of the regime’s terrorist activities outside Libya. This massive and coordinated
pressure from the outside risked the stability and continuity. Qaddafi “rehabilitated” the tribes
to use them as a tool to consolidate his power and ensure stability.105The government founded
the Popular Social Leadership Assembly consisting of tribal leaders in 1993, whose task was to
monitor Libyans and rally support for the government during those hard times. The leaders
were tasked with condemning members from their tribe that spoke against the government and
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denouncing them publicly.106 Such leaders were a major part of Qaddafi’s propaganda and
mobilization of the masses.
Part of this rehabilitation was changing the structure of leadership within the tribes.He
would give direct access to the revolutionary leadership to a non-influential or poor member of
a tribe that he sought to bring under his wing, thus marginalizing the current leaders. This
person would eventually become the acting leader, for he would be the one able to provide the
members of the tribe with their needs and social security. Instead of ostracizing this person and
rallying behind the tribal leader, the members would give him respect and admire his authority,
despite his recent insignificance in their lives.107 This proves that the need for tribalism is not
for identity establishment or honoring of blood ties but rather to fill the void of lack of
institutions. Due to the lack of a state and civil society in the traditional sense, the tribes filled
the void of local institutions able to cater to the needs of their areas and civil society able to
connect the people with their government.108 Such abandonment of previous leaders for the
sake of having the needs of the community met is clear proof of this argument
Amal Obeidi’s survey uncovered that Libyans used tribal connections to acquire
necessities and some degree of representation and were willing to let go of tribal identification
if they could fulfill these desires through proper state mechanisms.109 These findings give
weight to the idea that tribalism in Libya is not an everlasting Libyan condition but rather an
attempt at creating civil society to fill the void left by state institutions. She also uncovered that
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tribe members often relate to their state, city, and religion as their “primal nexus of social
attachment”110 rather than their tribe.
Till the end of the regime there was a constant mixture of tribal and national ethos to fill
the needs of the regime and its whims. However, just like national coalitions or ideas, the tribal
ethos had no real power outside its use as a tool for regime sustainability.111 Unfortunately the
mixture of tribal and national ethos was used to some extent during the revolution and to a
great extent during the transitional period. Nevertheless, the tribal ethos continued to be a tool
for powerful players, not a motivation of such players.112This will be discussed in the following
chapter.
To conclude, this chapter aimed to paint an image of the state of the national institutions
and identity inherited from the Qaddafi era and to indicate how there was a systematic attempt
to deconstruct the major political, economic, and social aspects of the nation. The major point
extracted from this chapter is that Libya’s national identity did and does exist. However, it was
marginalized during the Qaddafi era through taking the state out of the picture and the
empowerment of peripheral actors and pseudo-institutions. This had a grave impact on the fate
of the transitional period, as will be discussed in detail in the following chapter for the state did
not emerge as the central entity able to govern the country.
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CHAPTER V: THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (2012–2014)

The unsteady transitional period after the fall of the Qaddafi regime is discussed here, within the
framework set by the previous chapter. It is true that the mistakes that took place in this period,
burdened by the legacy of the previous one, led to the current conflict in Libya. However, those
mistakes could have been avoided, the current conflict was not inevitable and neither are future
conflicts. Such mistakes are discussed in this chapter in detail and an alternative roadmap that
discusses what needed to be done to avoid conflict is discussed in the conclusion of the chapter.
The following chapter proposes policies and ideas to help foster peace and safeguard the Libyan
national identity and future.
The Political Process
What were the major characteristics of the political process during the transitional period?
During the revolutionary war of 2011, a body was constructed to present the revolution
politically, administer the liberated cities, and manage the war efforts.113 The National
Transitional Council received great support from the population, for it represented a sense of
unity and organizational structure able to attract international support for the revolution.114 One
of its most important tasks was creating the roadmap for Libya after Qaddafi, and it did not see
itself as a part of it in the long run, for it was not an elected body. It decided to organize
national elections for the General National Congress on July 7, 2012, less than a year after the
end of the conflict. The hope was that the success of the election would ensure future
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democratic and inclusive elections, legitimize the revolution by having an elected leadership,
induce sustainable peace, and set the foundations of the newly born culture of democracy.115
A law was created for the first election that was seen to fit the situation by the
transitional council, but three issues were raised after it was public. The quota for women was
seen as demeaning; the inability of those having dual citizenship to run was deemed as
marginalization of an important segment of professionals; and having people run as
independents and not as coalitions representing political parties was criticized since the
political process in Libya was too immature for that.116
Amendments were made: the quotas were lifted, double nationalities could run, and the
TNC made a law about political parties and then repealed it and made law about political
entities rather than parties, since the elections were happening too fast for the strong conditions
that had to be met before parties could register. The level of ease of inception was like that of
civil society organizations.117
It was agreed in the end that political entities would have 80 seats and independents 120
seats. At first, it was to be 200 seats for independents. The elections as procedure were
considered a great procedural success, as 2.8 million citizens took part in them.118A base of
voters was established and divided over twelve electoral districts. The elections were viewed as
a great success but that was simply a façade. Lurking underneath the beautiful image were the
deep dissensions it awakened, for it was a major source of division rather than unity.119
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A great amount of literature discusses the point that elections taking place at the
immediate end of a war would be too immature and unfruitful. Holding such elections before
disarmament, demobilization, and creation of a constitution can lead to adverse effects.120 A
major side effect of hastened elections without the necessary institutional support is that it
incentivizes former combatants to influence it in attempts to shape the political reality to their
will. Libya is a prime case study that supports this theory.121 Various powerful jihadists,
criminal units, old regime cronies, Islamists, federalists, tribal leaders, liberalists, and local
militias created alliances to exert pressure on the electoral process before the ballots were even
cast in order to shape it to their liking.122
The NTC was faced with an impossible situation that they were not equipped to deal
with, for it had to choose between two difficult scenarios. If they made an effort to put into
effect the formal rules of the democratic game, they could risk the re-emergence of violence. If
they went through a policy of compromise, appeasement, and accommodation of such
disruptive illegitimate forces they would encourage further attempts to make more demands to
enforce their will on the central authority.123 The latter path was chosen, since the NTC did not
have the support of strong national institutions, especially security institutions, and a
constitution. This opened the door for peripheral actors to subjugate the central government.
The heir of the NTC, the GNC, inherited the weaknesses of the NTC, which derailed the
roadmap of the transitional period and turned it into a vicious maze.
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What amplified the weakness of the GNC were the lack of a majority within it and the
interference of peripheral actors, each supporting different groups. Tension rose because of this
disequilibrium. This disequilibrium caused many pressures on the formation of the ministries:
there were too many interests playing on the field, and they played whatever cards they had to
strengthen their parties 'interest.124 Thus a great amount of the laws that came out of the GNC
were for the political interest of a party or entity. A prime example was the law of political
isolation. Many researchers and the majority of the interviewees believed it to benefit one
group over another, rather than being an attempt to cut ties with the previous regime.125
The law of political isolation stipulated that anyone who held office or was part of a
revolutionary committee during the Qaddafi era was banned from participating in the political
process in any way whatsoever, even if no crimes had been committed by this person and no
corruption was proven. This law ostracized a great number of Libyan technocrats and further
deepened the divide in Libyan streets. Within Libyan streets, some hailed it as a great step
forward, but the majority was shocked by such decisions and lack of coordinated work towards
reconstruction and development.
Such actors who were no longer allowed to participate in the political process even if
they had actively participated in the revolution, such as a great number of the members of the
NTC who had led the revolution,126 felt betrayed and ostracized. Some of them resorted to
other means to affect the political process, thus adding to the number of peripheral actors on the
Libyan scene who compromised the state authority. “Political isolation was designed in a way
to eliminate competition. There was no need for since it the punishment law would punish
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anyone who committed a crime and anyone who did would be out of the game. Thus the law’s
official goals were already met and there was no need for it,” said Mr. Khalid El-Jazwy.
Parliament vs GNC
The continuous squabbling between the numerous state and non-state actors over power due to
the lack of a strong central authority and institutions gave birth to political violence and an
increase in the conflict between different militias and armed groups. Libyan streets were
divided and an immense hatred towards the “other” reached dangerous heights. Incidents of
assassinations, kidnapping, and armed groups forcing their will over the government became
common, especially in Benghazi. All of this culminated in the current armed conflict taking
place in Libya and the existence of two governments.
When the new parliament was elected, the voter turnout was less than a million: for
example, many members won seats with 1000 votes or less.127 This shows the lack of interest
of voters to partake in the political process due to continuous disappointment in the government
that culminated over the 2012–2014 period. The new parliament was meant to be in the east to
calm down the federalist movement, but Benghazi was not stable so they decided to convene in
Toubrok. Before they did that, the GNC wanted power to be handed over in Tripoli. The
parliament refused to do such a thing for they saw it as mere protocol rather than a fundamental
step in the transfer of power. The GNC declared the parliament to be unconstitutional and vice
versa; thus Libya came under two governments with two budgets and two ministerial
councils.128
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The Constitution
The lack of political experience caused a lengthening of the political process. The TNC existed
from March 2011 till July 2012. The GNC was meant to create a committee to set the
constitution; however, due to outside pressures, especially from the federalists in the east, it
decided to have a national election for the committee.129 Just as with the elections for the GNC
itself, due to the inheritance of the policy of appeasement, the electoral process was changed to
be based on an equal quota from the three parts of Libya, a prime example of regionalism and
preferring appeasement over ability.
If one looks at this period, one will see that the constitutional committee was set up
halfway through and was supposed to be working for a year but exceeded that. The initial road
map was meant to end in a specified time with a straight road, but many turns were taken for
many reasons. The governments had huge budgets but no productivity, because they were
appointed due to pressures and strong-arming from many players including the political, tribal
and ideological teams. At first, the conflict over Libya was ideological, for they wanted to use
whatever tools they had to expand their power rather than serving the nation, and there were
many layers to the conflict because of the tribal allegiances and militias. All of these actors
were putting pressure on the governments. Despite the immaturity of the political process, it
could have been much smoother without all the pressures from the numerous actors; but with
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that pressure, it was doomed to fail. The road map was changed and halted in numerous
ways.130
Corruption and Nepotisim
How was the state of the central Libyan institutions during and after the time of
Qadaffi?
A typical Libyan institution after the revolution would have hundreds of employees who hardly
came to work or were productive on the rare occasions when they did. The entire budget for
their salaries and the cost of operation (electricity, water, etc.…) is considerable without any
addition to the state. At the end of the year, the institution hands in its budget to the Libyan
Audit Bureau, and it gives a report stating that they are not financially corrupt, even if the
actual product of the institution is non-existent.131
This was the case because they defined the budget in the same old corruption-inducing
manner. There were three divisions: operational, salaries, and transformational (defined as
actual production and development). There was not much care about items that were put in the
first two categories; it did not matter what the budget was despite the lack of work, as if they
were asking for corruption and encouraging lack of productivity.132
The legacy from the previous regime and all those issues were carried on in the
institutions so that, even if the chiefs who were directly involved, benefiting, and working hand
in hand with Qaddafi are removed, these empty burdens of institutions riddled with corruption
and lack of productivity remained, and they put a tremendous strain on the government by
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weighing it down. The state of the institutions is enough of a burden in itself; add to that the
amount of corrupt officials standing in the face of reform, either for the sake of personal gain or
to undermine the revolution due to their remaining loyalty to the old regime, and this effect is
multiplied.133 According to some of the interviewees currently working in the state institutions,
the nature of the old state still exists and the old guard still has control of the institutions either
directly or through supporters within them who are hindering development and reform.134 This
is normal and expected to happen after the end of a civil war or a conflict.135
For example, a manager of a financial department in an institution might not be aware
of his specialization within it and his responsibilities. Neither does the head of the institution,
and thus he intervenes in the jobs of his managers. The idea of the one-man show which would
intervene in all departments as if they owned the institution still existed. This is another effect
of the lack of clear job descriptions and hiring based on specialty, as discussed in the previous
chapter. Much of the blatant miss-hiring known in the previous era remained. For example,
while conducting this research, interactions took place with people working in international
offices who did not have the simplest knowledge of the English language or a degree in the job
area.
To conclude, the TNC was in a hurry to create the GNC before a constitution was even
made. The political process was too immature and unable to handle all the transitions.136The
longer such a period takes with unqualified people the harder it is to manage, as new conflicts
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will rise.137The governments that came and went throughout the 2012–2014 period were
working on crisis management rather than state building, which raised the frustration levels
within the population.138 Looking at the budgets spent by such governments, one would be
baffled, for such spending achieved nothing for development but was largely absorbed by the
overly inflated institutions through salaries without productivity and blatant corruption due to
the lack of regulatory bodies.139
In a democratic system, the competition between parties over ideological differences is
natural, but that was taken to a new level in the Libyan case, a level that put the government in
gridlock and halted development. The ideological differences between the newly emerged
political parties of Libya are not great at all. The limited projects and developmental plans
proposed by them did not differ greatly. They all focused on reconstruction and reconciliation,
while building a national army and regaining the Libyan share of the international oil
markets.140 However, they competed against each other within the parliament by working
against bills proposed by the other, and the only way forward was compromises over key
positions in the branches of government, where further competition would take place. All of
these clashes were translated into unbearable inefficiency in the already subpar institutions. Not
only that, but they also translated into violence in the streets created by loyal militias or
organized armed criminals. There were many incidents of assassinations and kidnaping and
with the unavailability of proper security institutions to investigate the perpetrators. Once such
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incidents took place, the other side would be accused immediately and tensions would rise
within the camps of power, further dividing the already segmented Libyan society.141

Media
The majority of interviewees, including Mr. Gamal who was a veteran of the media for thirty
years till his retirement in 2014, cited the new media that emerged after the fall of Qaddafi as a
force of division in Libya. There was an explosion of TV networks after the fall of Qaddafi and
they were heavily funded and managed by individuals or groups in the political scene or tied to
them.142 Such channels are often not referred to by their names within conversation but rather
by the names of their owners or of the bodies that that they are affiliated with. The reason for
such claims, according to Mr. Elsweeh and others is that those media institutions were used as
tools for spreading political dissension, based on a biased depiction of reality. There were no
regulatory bodies and laws that could monitor the ethics of such channels in their reporting. It
is not that the interviewees were calling for limitation of press freedom, but rather for an
objective body or laws that could monitor them and have authority to point out unethical
conflict-inducing coverage meant to further empower a political actor without being based on
proper sources and reality. Such biased production of news by the various channels was the
norm, and all actors were involved in mobilizing media for personal interest without exception.
Mr. Gamal made a very interesting comment by saying it was as if the media of Qaddafi
and his state channels gave birth to many others who catered to their owners the way his media
provided him with the propaganda he desired. This makes perfect sense, since the Libyan
media professionals were raised and trained within such institutions, so even though their
support became for other powerful players, their tools were the same. In the fragile state of
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Libya after having the social fabric of the society torn apart and new tears emerging due to the
conflict over power that ensued, having such biased media helped to open old wounds and
enlarge new ones throughout the nation.

Security Institutions
Why was Libya unsuccessful in creating a united national army after the revolution?
For a newly reborn nation which had just came out of a devastating war, building or reforming
security institutions is an imperative task to ensure the protection and preservation of the
revolutionary gains.143Unavailability of such institutions endangers the success of the
executive, legislative, and judicial powers in building state institutions and establishing order.
Most importantly it makes the legitimate government unable to establish its mandate and
jurisdiction over all corners of the state.144 The entity in charge of establishing the army or
reorganizing it was the ministry of defense, and its performance will be reviewed based on
publications by the government and international institutions alongside the in-depth
interviewees conducted with statesmen and activists.
From 2012 to 2014, the ministry in general suffered from great inadequacies and
inability to control spending or direct it well towards its number one priority of constructing a
national army. The state of Libya gave 17 billion dollars to the ministry of defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff between 2012 and 2014.145 Despite the massive nature of the budget, it failed to
be translated into reality on the ground, since no national army was created. Despite the
massive spending during these two years, the ministry of defense released many statements
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announcing the lack of resources and military equipment to establish stability and security. The
performance of the ministry and the institutions working under it is marred by failures,
mismanagement, lack of institutional structure, and chaotic decision making, showing a lack of
a united vision for the major tasks at hand.146
The military institution was managed within a raging conflict between the chiefs of staff
and the defense ministry over jurisdiction. This had dire effects on the formation of an army,
for there was a constant state of conflict over major topics such as budgets and assignments of
personnel. This caused stagnation in the process of creating the army and caused the state to be
unable to extend its power into the different regions of Libya.147
According to the Libyan Audit Bureau report for 2014, there is a general weakness in
managing provisions and direction of resources towards building a national army. The internal
monitoring systems were not doing their jobs, in addition to there being huge weaknesses in
organizing the different administrations. The ministry was also unable to devise time plans to
their proposed goals and actions, thus causing the whole process to lack structure.
The part of the budget dedicated to salaries rose over the two years reaching a high of
3.6 billion Libyan Dinars in 2014.148 This number could cover the salaries of 250,000 people if
they were receiving an average of 1200 dinars each a month. This number does not make sense,
for there are no official national army members on the ground to justify such salaries. In fact in
times where there was a need for military intervention, the ministry would call upon rebel
militias that were not under their supervision or command. There are numerous incidents of
such interventions, such as the one to resolve conflict between the Tabo and Arabic tribes in
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Koufra, confronting the pro-Qaddafi militants who occupied the Tamnhent military base in
Sabha, and many others. Instead of providing the state with legitimate forces working under the
mandate of the democratically elected government, the ministry depended on militias, thus
legitimizing those unregulated forces that do not fall under the command of the state. Salaries
and operational budgets were spent on them without them being accountable to the state.
The report continues by describing the utter lack of control over weapons and
equipment contracts. Individuals within these institutions, who did not have jurisdiction over
signing such contracts, did so. Such transactions took place without proper reporting and
transparency. Worst of all, great amounts of money were spent for such purchases without
knowing where and to whom those weapons went. This increase in the importing of such
quantities of military equipment is not visible on the ground, since the scene was dominated by
rebel militias rather than a national army. These purchases raised many question in regard to
corruption, and the supplying of militias that are supported by strong players in the government
with weapons by these government institutions, rather than integrating them into an army.
Much of the spending went into non-military ends, and with no proper documentation
or financial reporting. One of the greatest areas of spending was on salaries going to members
of armed militias without genuine attempts to integrate them into the national army.149Such
militias received more or less the same perks as the national forces, without the regulations and
accountability that should come with it. Instead of inhibiting the growth of such unregulated
forces, the government induced an explosion in the numbers and capital of those militias after
the revolution and maintained their weapons and bases.
According to Dr. Khamis, who worked on governmental and civil society initiatives to
integrate the rebels into national armed forces, the ultimate fiasco was that salaries were given
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to militias, or “rewards” for the rebels, as they were called. “This is what brought down the
revolution and broke its backbone,” as he said. The numbers of rebels at the end of the 2011
revolutionary war was around 20,000 men who were fighting at the front for the sake of the
nation and the revolution without the expectations of reward.150
When the war ended, the rebels remained in their posts in order to protect the vital
infrastructure and maintain peace and order during that sensitive period until they could give
their weapons and bases to a legitimate institution. They did so to protect the gains of the
revolution without the expectation of rewards and compensation. Many of them left and went
back to their civilian lives or went abroad to continue their studies on fellowships given to them
by the state. Those who remained in their militias were either waiting for the government to
build an institution to absorb them or waiting till they were no longer needed before going back
to civilian life.151
Once money was introduced into the equation, the number of rebels suddenly exploded
to 270, 000, according to the latest statistics. “Where did these numbers come from? If this was
the actual number of rebels fighting in the war, Qaddafi’s security militias would not have
lasted a week,” said Dr. Khamis. Payments and rewards without state accountability became
the expected norm. New militias started forming, and many young men who did not take part in
the war started joining, while many of the actual rebels left the scene. This new wave of rebels
wanted further funding and “rewards,” and if they did not receive it they would not perform
their security duties such as protecting the vital infrastructure and would go on crippling
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strikes. Due to the delay in creating security institutions that could take over, the need for such
militias increased and so did their influence and power.152
This inflation of the “rebels” gave revolutionary legitimacy and power to those that had
nothing to do with it. Many of them were simply unemployed, or outlaws even. Those pseudorebels were a main cause of post-revolution chaos. Great amounts of money were bullied out of
the government and such military units halted and stood in the way of the creation of a unified
army since they were not willing to give up their weapons and privileges. In addition, since the
death of the Qaddafi regime, the enemy that united the rebels no longer exists, and tensions
between different cities and regions started to surface. This vast influx in militias and armed
men helped to exacerbate such tensions. Such tensions will be elaborated on in more detail in
the identity section of this chapter.
If one puts oneself in the shoes of a militia leader, after the introduction of money in
great amounts, it would be more profitable to get more recruits with the promise of money so
that your militia would get stronger. The motivation for empowering one’s militia could have
different origins. It could before patriotic reasons, to be more able to protect Libya, or it could
be seen as measure to make the military power within one’s city, region, or tribe equivalent to
or stronger than that of others, or it could be out of pure greed.153 Many of those who joined
after the revolution and received leading positions within militias came from modest
backgrounds, and now they have an access to income that they would not have dreamt of
outside this system. There were no real and solid criteria or government supervision over who
joined the militias, for they have autonomy from the government, despite functioning with
money from it under the mandate of securing the country.154 This repeated the sad scenario of
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Qaddafi’s creation of his militias, for, just like them, the militia leaders recruited from their
tribes and cities those who would be loyal to them and their goals, be they noble or sinister.
The weakness of the government institutions in charge of creating a united army and the
conflicts between its different departments over power would have made the task extremely
hard but maybe doable. However, the absolute lack of an institutional structure containing
supervision and regulatory systems induced so much corruption that it crippled them even
further. However, the greatest blunder was the rewards paid, for they ushered in a race for
wealth and control between the different militias and made the dream of an army impossible.
There was limited loyalty to Libya as whole, but rather to oneself and one’s own benefit or
tribal and regional background. Some even signed up for more than two or three militias and
would be receiving money from each.155
When asked about the efforts to integrate the rebels into a national army, Dr. Khamis
and others discussed numerous initiatives that failed to be translated into reality. The main
reason was the introduction of money before the guaranteed formal service within state
institutions, but they were others reasons and reservations. One of the main reasons was the
lack of a genuine will to give up weapons and bases, because of the absence of trust in the new
government. There was no legitimate body to hand the weapons over to. A lot of the weapons
that the government collected at the outset were reintegrated into the streets again, due to the
lack of transparency and regulatory systems over the process.156 According to Dr. Khamis, a
former defense minister sent the weapons collected in the early days of the transitional
government to his city, which is a perfect example of officials using their power for the gains of
their tribes and region. No records were found to confirm such an accusation, off course;
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therefore the name of the minister is not included here. However, the point was confirmed by
another interviewee who refused to have his name published.157 Such corruption, blatant
mismanagement, and favoritism caused a lack of trust and apprehension between the state and
the militias. Even those who were willing to give up the weapons did not trust that the
government would not put them back in the hands of people who might use the weapons
against them. As clashes increased between armed groups, maintaining weaponry was a tool for
survival.158
There was no or limited unity between the different rebel groups because each one
believed he and his group to be the guardians over Libya and that they should be in power and
in charge. Such sense of unity should have been established by the new government through
capitalizing on the general patriotic and unifying wave induced by the success of the
revolution. There was no trust between the rebels and the government. The heads of the major
parties were not clear enough with the people for them to place their trust in the political
structure. Their loyalty was for their parties. Hence no weapons were collected and an army
could not be formed.159
Conferences were arranged by civil society to make policy recommendation for the task
of creating an army. Their goal was to unify efforts and set the stage for the militias to be
incorporated into an army by connecting their ideas and fears to the government. “We tried to
propose financial ways to attract them, for example buying weapons off of them for double
their value in the black market.”160They also tried to have personality and ability tests to weed
out the undisciplined. Unfortunately none of those initiatives made it into reality.
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Numerous direct causes for the failures of the transitional governments to create a
unified army were discussed in this section. However if one steps back and looks at the big
picture, one will find that the heavy legacy of the forty-two years of Qaddafi’s regime is the
root of all of these issues. The weak institutions inherited from that time with the dire
conditions discussed in the previous chapter and the lack of political or regulatory military
experience hindered the ability of the state make sound decision or to be apple to enforce such
decisions. The destruction of the military and lack of legal frameworks that might fill the void
stopped the ability of security sector reforms, for no such sector was there to begin with. What
were there were informality, illegality, and inexperience. Even though Qaddafi was gone, the
culture of vicious corruption and sub-national ties remained.
Identity
1. Do you believe that there is no united identity in Libya? Why or why not?
2. If you believe in the lack of or the weakness of a national Libyan identity, do you
believe that it contributed in jeopardizing the transitional process?
Aspects of the distorted national identity, which is the second sinister child of the old regime,
are discussed in this section. As discussed in earlier chapters, the power of tribes and nature of
tribalism were fading during the time of the monarchy. It is not to say that they were no longer
active on the scene, but the need for them by society members decreased due to the emergence
of the state.161Qaddafi brought tribalism back and politicized the tribes as a way to rally
allegiance and surround himself with those who were loyal and place them as the watchers over
other tribes and cities. However, at the end of the day one must recognize them as a mere tool

161

Al-Bashir Ali Alkot, Libya; identity, tyranny, and revolution, National Libyan Library 2012 (In Arabic only)

62

Betelmal
of regime sustainability rather than a partner in government.162 Another side effect of his policy
of deconstructing the state institutions is that, due to the lack of social protection, citizens
turned to tribal means to achieve that, just as they did under the Italian invasion. During the
time of Qaddafi, Libya’s inability to foster a national identity was not because of tribalism but
because of the policies Qaddafi used to maintain power and control while shaping Libya’s
identity and institutions as he saw fit. The same applies now. After forty-two years of chaotic
rule, a year of revolutionary war, and four years of political and military hostilities, Libyans
cannot receive social security from the state. Consequently, Libya is not failing to become a
nation because of tribalism; tribalism is gaining ground because of the utter lack of a functional
state.163
As discussed before, nationalism, patriotism, citizenship, and unity are forged greatly
once a national fight for independence takes place. In the eyes of the vast majority of Libyan
society who supported the revolution, the conflict of 2011 was a war of independence for the
sake of Libya: the nation that Qaddafi attempted to deconstruct in every way and build his
Jamahiriya in its place. The Libyan anthem and flag were changed by him, even the name of
the country itself became the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and there was an
unspoken rule of never saying Libya, but rather Jamahiriya.164 Ironically his attempt to create a
national identity with him at its core and center was successful, but not as he envisioned. It was
a national identity that despised him at its core.
The old flag returned and so did the national anthem. Libya’s name by itself became
one of the major chants during marches again the regime. There was a thirst to claim a true
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Libyan identity that was pure and national, away from Qaddafi’s shadow. Nationalism and
patriotism grew, and the general discourse was of unity under the TNC and to let go of previous
feuds and hatred within the nation, which had been instigated by his divide and conquer
methods. However the continuous failures described in detail in the previous section took place
and, slowly and surely, the disappointment and conflict over the future of Libya came to the
forefront and the sense of unity and nationalism became dormant.
The idea of citizenship in the sense of how a citizen has rights and obligations was
eliminated from Libyan society for forty-two years and Libyans were eager to adopt such
principles and join the democracies of the world. As discussed earlier, however, the core
necessities of social security and security were not provided by the new governments. Actors
seeking power from within the government and outside it alongside the failure of state
institutions to foster the newly found sense of identity caused the people to identify themselves
with what could give them social security. The empowerment of tribal influences by the
competing forces and the growth in federalist rhetoric forced people to pick sides, based on
their best interests rather than the national interest.165
The current existence of two governments right now and the call for Libya to become a
federalist state again are viewed generally as a tribal civil war by numerous
observers.166However, this is a complete misreading of the situation. The major cause of this is
the competition between islamists, old guards, liberalists, and militia leaders all being
supported by Libyan coalitions and international coalitions. The details and motives behind
these conflicts are outside the scope of this research. However, one of their main causes is the
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lack of institutionalism and political development, which caused the national identity of Libya
to become dormant once again after its awakening in 2011.
Conclusion: Was the Current Conflict Inevitable?
1. What are the most important lessons learned from the first transitional period that must
be implemented once the current conflict is concluded?
One of the main questions in the interviews and the research in general was what were
the major lessons to be learned from the transitional period? This aimed to help in formulating
policy recommendations, which are discussed in detail in the following chapter. It also
indirectly answered the question of this section: Was the current conflict inevitable? The
answer is no. Despite the numerous challenges facing the transitional governments from the
dark legacy of the Qaddafi era, the rise in divisions and power hungry actors’ ability to
influence the democratic process from the periphery could have been avoided.
Libyan decision makers should have learned from the previous Libyan experience of
independence. The TNC should have remained in power, despite its lack of electoral legitimacy
until the constitution was made. Elections should not have taken place before setting the proper
legal framework of the state in motion. This period of constitution creation would have given
time for infant political parties to develop and create viable strategies and plans; also it would
have given civil society institutions the time to grow on the ground. Having a constitution and a
reformed national legal framework present prior to the election would have ensured the
existence of regulatory bodies and accountability, just as it did at the birth of the Libyan
monarchy.
General restructuring of state institutions should have started, with the priority given to
the security institutions. Financial rewards to the rebels should never have taken place until
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they had become formal soldiers in the national army, and a strong institutional framework
should have been set to gather weapons and store them safely. Incentives should have been
made to attract militias to join the army instead, as discussed earlier; it seemed as if incentives
were given not to do so.
If the GNC had inherited a more established and institutionalized state, the national
unity and identity born after the revolution would have remained. A Libyan national identity
does exist, despite what observers might argue. Libyans had shown it in their two struggles for
independence, despite all attempts of their oppressors to eliminate it. If there were a true
attempt to reform the institutions to make them capable of protecting the rights of citizens and
providing them with security and rights, the personalist, self-interested spheres of influence
would have not emerged or used divisive strategies to gain and maintain power.
Instead of forsaking conflict over power and joining together in a national momentum,
these forces added to the tear in the social fabric of Libya. The reasons behind this cannot be
known precisely. However, the following assumption can give an idea of why this happened.
There was a great amount of international intervention in Libya from neighboring countries and
international powers, and they supported the different contesting parties financially and
military, alongside diplomatic backing.167 This empowered the momentum of the conflict
instead of slowing it down. Many interviewers shed light on forces loyal to the Qaddafi era
manipulating the political process to compromise reforms, and post-conflict reconstruction and
reconciliation. Further research on the actions done by such individuals could be instructive;
however, it would be quite difficult to carry out.
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION
Institutions
The ultimate hurdle that faced Libya’s transition to democracy was the delay in the creation of
the constitution and legal reforms to enhance the operational capacities of Libyan institutions.
Due to this void and lack of political experience, the political sphere of Libya was only
democratic in theory rather than practice. This scene became a war zone between different
players aiming to gain power and create their own image and vision of Libya with them at its
center. Unlike the early days of the monarchy, where the executive and legislative branches
worked hand in hand under the mandate of the constitutions, those branches lacked a legal
framework that specified their jurisdiction and authority; thus, there were many transgressions.
Such action caused an atmosphere of competition over power, rather than cooperation towards
state building and development, where peripheral players exerted influence over the elected
government and operated outside the democratic framework.
What happened in the transitional Libya was an institutional failure at all levels due to
the shape of the institutions inherited from the old regime. The political scene turned into an
open conflict zone between different parties over power and control, despite their having
similar ideologies. Such conflict was not tribal, for the parties had members from different
tribes and regions, and the tribal system was not able to affect Libyan politics. It was Libyan
politics that mobilized the tribal sphere as a tool to gain support, rather than the opposite, which
is an overwhelming argument in international literature. It is as if the new players on the
Libyan scene were copying the Qaddafi playbook of command; again, they fostered illegal
militias and enlisted tribal and regional support to gain power.
Libyan institutions are extremely underdeveloped and are dragged down by a high level
of centralization in Tripoli, causing a sense of marginalization in the other cities. Such
centralization continued after the revolution; however the transitional government recognized it
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as an issue and there were attempts to reduce it. Unfortunately, success was elusive, due to the
lack of institutional capacity to achieve it. As a matter of fact, it was elusive in all the tasks
undertaken by the government. Libya lacked the institutions capable of ushering in the
transition to democracy and equality, for such institutions were systematically destroyed during
the Qaddafi era. They lacked administrative structure and proper staffing criteria. There was
limited training and capacity building for employees, and they suffered from an extreme lack of
productivity. The key positions were all taken by those who were loyal rather than those who
were capable, and what they craved was Qaddafi’s approval rather than building a nation.Thus
the institutions were hollow and marred by crippling corruption.
Due to the desire of the regime to be the main source of employment, in order to control
the livelihood of the population to further strengthen its grip on people, it discouraged private
businesses and overinflated the public sector with employees. The institutions were being
dragged down by this unbearable weight of untrained and inefficient employees during the
transitional period.168
The lack of regulatory bodies that can report corruption and make those who take part
in it accountable caused the loss of great amounts of public funds meant for development.
Corruption during the time of Qaddafi was immense because of this weak system and that
continued after its fall. Looking at the reports of the National Audit Bureau, one cannot help
but be baffled by the huge budgets given to the government without proof of any development
on the ground. Many of the interviewees suggested that, during the post-revolutionary period,
corruption was greater than it was during the time of Qaddafi. The reasoning behind such
assumptions is that, before, the top-ranking employees and leaders would be the ones
committing the majority of the theft of public funds. The lower level bureaucrats were not as
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engaged in such practices, out of fear of the revolutionary leadership. After the fall of such
leadership, corruption became a free-for-all competition for wealth-seeking by immoral means
throughout all levels of the convoluted bureaucracy.169

Identity
Due to its strategic location and military weakness, Libya was subjected to invaders throughout
its history and in many instances different parts were under different invaders, which hindered
the development of a national identity. Over the years, local Libyan leadership and unity was
defined by tribal loyalty. By the time of independence, the sense of Libya was starting to
operate at the national rather than the tribal and regional levels, due to resistance against the
Italian invader and the joint struggle for state building after independence. Recognizing the
differences within Libya and the vast distances between its urban centers, a federal system was
constructed by the constitution, but once the newly independent state started to come into its
own, an amendment passed that ended the federal system. The reason why this was possible
was that institutions at the national and local levels served the citizens and filled the political
void that the tribal system used to fill. The monarchy capitalized on the sense of unity induced
by independence to help foster the newly born national Libyan identity. With the rise in
education and increase in urbanization, the tribal system retreated to influencing social aspects
instead of being a generator of political influence. The more integrated the citizens became in
the state and its modern institutions, the more they moved away from tribal loyalty and
allegiances. The tribal system still remained deeply rooted within the rural areas which
remained outside the direct influence of the state, but it was slowly and surely diminishing in
power and influence by the time of the Qaddafi coup of 1969.170
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When Qaddafi came to power, he wanted to shape Libya’s identity as he saw fit, and
with him at the center, of course. He flirted with socialism, Arab nationalism, and African unity
throughout his time and attempted to imprint his theories and ideas on society. He used
education and endless propaganda to achieve such goals and project them abroad as Libya's
identity.171 At first, he desired to end the tribal system in all its forms and fought against it with
all means possible. Some analysts believe that he did so because of the inferior status of his
own tribe in Libya; others believed that this was part of his desire to be the only source of unity
and legitimacy within the state.172 However, over time it became clear to him that he could use
the tribal system with his tribe at its center to consolidate his power, divide opposition, and
reach the masses for mobilization. He deployed a wicked strategy of divide and conquer, by
opening up old feuds between cities and tribes and treating certain tribes favorably over others
to induce conflict. Tribal leaders raced to be in his good graces in order to gain political power
and wealth, which caused the politicization of tribalism in Libya. The key point to derive from
studying the existing literature on Libya and the in-depth interviews with people who worked
with the tribal system or within it is that, at the end of the day, the tribes were used as tools and
had only the political authority that Qaddafi gave them. They were not political actors able to
cause any change but were rather used to rally support.
They remained as tools of the revolution after his fall, but under the new political actors
competing for control over Libya. Many researchers and analysts overstate the actual power of
the tribes and assume that the current conflict over Libya’s future is of a tribal nature, but in
reality they are just a tool to mobilize the masses, especially outside the urban areas. The
majority of the interviewees and the writer of this research have no connection with their tribes
and do not even know the identity of the sheikh of the tribe. This mobilization of tribal
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connections and waking up of historic feuds after the end of the revolution is simply a
continuation of Qaddafi’s policies carried out by numerous political actors.
Policy Recommendations:
What are the most important lessons learned from the first transitional period that must
be implemented once the current conflict is concluded?
The Libyan government took the idea of democracy as simply voting and lost sight of the other
major factors of the system. There was a lack of serious political will to establish proper
institutions that would be capable of serving and representing the people of Libya, they failed
to foster and assist the newly born civil society, and there was a marginalization of numerous
segments of society.173 These are not the only shortcomings of the government, but are the ones
that have most relevance to this thesis, and the policy recommendations that will follow aim to
tackle these issues. The policy recommendation of this thesis argue that, to heal the torn social
fabric of the society resulting from the conflict and to stop further conflicts from happening, the
government needs to develop a serious political will to include the people of Libya in the
development process. Inclusion and participation have proven to be major tools for both
reconciliation and building of the political capital of the state, a political capital that would
support the government’s ability to make significant changes at the macroeconomic level.
The first step that must be taken with extreme haste once the current conflict is
concluded is the formation of a national constitution. The lack of it in the transitional period is
one of the hurdles, if not the greatest hurdle, in the 2012–2014 periods. It has to state clearly
the jurisdictions and the mandate of all of the key political institutions to avoid the conflict and
dissension that Libyan institutions were engulfed in which hindered development.
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During the time spent in Libya to conduct the interviews in February 2016, there was a
general argument in the population that was discussed with more focus with the interviewees. It
called for the removal of parties for their failure in the transitional period of 2012 to 2014, and
many argue that they are a key cause for the current conflict. Some of the interviewees agreed
with such thinking, and others believed that parties are crucial for the democratic process and
must not be disbanded. However, the latter would recommend that those parties and the laws
governing parties must be reformed. Once the current conflict is concluded and the constitution
is on track again, the parliament should be suspended and the legislative power should
transferred to the presidential council until the constitution and laws governing parties are
established. During this time the parties could improve their image and restructure their ranks
and developmental strategies.
The notion of simply disbanding parties is absurd for they are a key component for the
democratic process. A healthy competition between them brings out the best, and most agreed
on visions for development. They work at national level, thus bringing people together across
tribal and regional lines under similar goals, and, if a nation such as Libya let go of such forces
that are able to mobilize the masses and reach people on the ground, that would open the door
for other forces such as tribal ones. According to a member of the GNC who did not want her
name to be published and an advisor to the prime minister in the western government, the
eastern parliament was an example of tribal control and influence, since its members ran as
independents and not through a party platform. The lack of formal political units in the east in
general allowed the tribal and regional influences to be more apparent at the core of their
policies. On the other hand, the only notion more absurd than disbanding the parties is to keep
the status quo; the creation of proper laws governing their operation and inception is
imperative, therefore this thesis recommends the suspension of the political process until the
constitutions and such laws have been produced.
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Efficient regulatory institutions need to be created to ensure transparency and curb
corruption. Corruption has be a blood-sucking beast draining the state budget and
compromising its reputation and image. The overly bureaucratic nature of the state institutions
must be curtailed to limit the levels of corruption and, most importantly, massive, gradual
reconstruction of such institutions must take place. The overly inflated offices need to be cut
down to maximize efficiency. Off course, massive sudden layoffs can be detrimental to peace
and social harmony, since the majority of the Libyan work force is employed within it. With
the presence of so many weapons in the streets, such drastic moves must be taken carefully to
avoid violence. A long-term plan should be set in motion, private sector companies should be
encouraged to hire Libyans, and communications must be set up between the private sector and
the government in order to understand each other’s needs. These needs can be the core of
training and continued education sponsored by the government to its employees in order to
facilitate their transition to the private sector. Accessible loans should be created for people
who want to start businesses once they leave the public sector. Generous severance packages
should be allocated to those who would like to quit, and in the first few years after the
conclusion of the current conflict the government should give every incentive for current public
sector employees to leave on their own.
After such a period, which would also allow for a maturation of the private sector, the
government should start laying off the most unproductive workers and limit the hiring of new
ones except for extreme necessity. This would allow the maximization of efficiency, since
better training and institutional development can take place with fewer employees. Also, due to
the decrease in numbers, the current employees could receive higher salaries and benefits
which would automatically lessen the bribe taking and foster more loyalty towards the
institution specifically and the state in general.
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Proper staffing must take place: each department in every institution must come up with
its ideal structure, setting out how many and which positions it needs to have in order for it to
conduct its duties, and the qualifications needed for each position. Such an ideal image of the
institutions should be the basis for restructuring efforts and the government should strive to
reach these gradually, based on a reasonable timetable.

Community-led development
Communities have within them the ability to survive and cope with hardship; humans within a
social unit be it a family, tribe, or a community have intrinsic mechanisms174 for survival.
Therefore post-conflict community-led development in which the people play an active role in
the developmental process has emerged as a crucial academic and professional discourse on the
subject of reconstruction.175
Due to the political weight and importance of maintaining peace after a conflict has
been concluded, international mediators and central governments tend not to prioritize, and thus
not pay the required attention, to participation and inclusion which induce social rights and
reforms. “Unfortunately social rights rarely rise to the top of agenda in post-conflict
negotiations.”176A major critique for international organizations, newly created central
governments, and donors is that their focus is mainly based upon immediate relief and
stabilization of the new political regime rather than long-term development of the society with
reconciliation and equity as the cornerstones for the future.177
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There can be severe consequences of the lack of social reform. A post-conflict society is
a sensitive one that expects, unrealistically, immediate improvement in the quality of life and
equality of opportunities. History has shown that this is impossible: reconstruction of both the
tangible and intangible assets of a nation does not happen overnight. It is a gradual and
systematic process. Those who benefit from it the earliest are those who are most equipped to
do so, such as those who are most educated, have existing capital, and those who were simply
on the victorious side of the conflict. Seeing this would already raise hatred and negative
feelings amongst those who are not part of the mentioned groups. This would cause further
social tension in a nation that is still at the beginning of healing its war scars. It could even
escalate if continued to a new conflict or a continuation of the previous one. Studies have
shown that post-conflict nations suffering from great inequality and corruption are more likely
than others to go back to conflict within the first ten years after the conclusion of the war178 and
Libya is a prime example of that.
Having community-led development in which the people can become active participants
in the development process, and in which the marginalized have their voices heard can play a
major role in countering the negative effects of the gradual nature of post-conflict
reconstruction. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, this was not the case in Libya after the
conclusion of the conflict. This paper proposes that the Libyan government should make
reconciliation and inclusion a priority through focusing on community-led development. To do
so, the government must develop strong local institutions, empower civil society and be
flexible with it, and last but not least turn the tribal aspects of Libya into a blessing rather than a
curse.
Local Institutions
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Local institutions provide direct representation of the people in their area of operation. They act
as a forum for discussion, decision making, and implementation. A major question that postconflict governments face is whether they should build on and develop the local institutions
that are left behind from the previous regime or create new ones.179 In the case of Libya, there
are a limited number of efficient local institutions, due to the high degree of centralization of
the old regime, which had revolutionary committees, weak and hollow local institutions and
tribal leadership work at such levels.
Unfortunately, tearing down the local institutions in Libya would be challenged by
traditional authorities that are fearful of adjustment. It can be detrimental to the image of the
currently new and weak government, and it can leave a vacuum that cannot be filled by new
local institutions immediately180 for they are not constructed overnight. The government will
need to pick its battles here, and reach a middle ground. A thorough and methodical assessment
of these institutions must take place. Those found to lack the ability to be participatory and
inclusive post reforms must be terminated. The rest will have to go through a calculated process
of reform to eliminate any intrinsic mechanisms established by the old regime that are capable
of being repressive and inducing marginalization.
New local institutions must be created where there is a lack of them; they must be
representative and participatory. They should also have the ability to aid the new government in
avoiding the mistakes that led to conflict in the first place. All local institutions must have
strong regulatory mechanisms to curb corruption, monitor progress critically, and maximize
transparency. Monitoring should happen from both sides: the central government must have
strong monitoring and regulatory bodies for the local institutions and the local institutions must
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be able to do the same to the central government on issues related to their jurisdiction and
operational framework. This is of the utmost importance in the Libyan case, for the danger of
funds being misplaced and given to armed militias outside the legitimate national defense
forces, which has plagued the Libyan society for the past three years, must be eliminated once
and for all.
The process of reforming the existing institutions and the creation of new ones is a
tremendously long-term one that is filled with hardship. It is impossible to achieve a greater
level of inclusion and participation through local institutions at a pace that meets the
expectations of society. Therefore, the ground forces that are able to directly engage the public,
induce participation, and raise awareness especially outside the urban centers need to be
capitalized on; such forces will be discussed in the following two sections.
Civil Society
A vibrant civil society is a key player in the advancement and construction of a nation. It
reaches the places that cannot be reached by the government and sheds light on them, raises
awareness about important issues, informs people of their rights, and serves as a civil body that
critiques and point out the shortcomings of governments.181 The process of community-led
post-conflict is impossible without it, for it is more able to reach the citizens and engage them.
This role is extremely important for Libya for the local institutions are either weak or nonexistent.
The task list facing a newly formed government in such a troubled time is huge to say
the least. Developing civil society could easily be pushed down the ladder of priorities; the
Libyan government has successfully done that over the past four years. Interviewees who were
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engaged in civil society discussed the lack of support given to civil society and how crippling
government bureaucracy halted its development. A way out of this dilemma, which is highly
needed in Libya, would be to delegate the task of fostering the civil society to nongovernmental actors such as international organizations, donors, and the private sector. The
government failed to foster the newly civil society, but rather hindered it.
Putting community-led development as a priority in the post-conflict discussions with
the first two would push them towards aiding civil society, be it through funds or capacity
building, which the newly born Libyan civil society desperately needs. Encouraging the
international and domestic private sector to establish partnerships with NGOs in return for tax
breaks and ease of bureaucratic procedures would induce another great push for civil society.
The image of a business is extremely important, and being a part of this process as a form of
corporate social responsibility would make their images and products easier to sell.
Even though the thesis proposes the delegation of the development of civil society to
other players, it by no means argues for the complete elimination of the government’s role in
this important undertaking. Open channels between non-governmental actors and central and
local government must be created. The government must make the process and the legal paper
work easier, and respond to those actors when they are in need of help.
Capitalize on the Social Strength of the Tribal System
A tribe is a social unit where people live, grow, and cope with outside factors together. This
thesis does not assume that all members of a tribe share identical beliefs and ways of thinking.
However, there is link between them due to their shared history and loyalty to their unit. Tribes
in Libya were on their way to playing a merely social role in society, prior to the Qaddafi
regime, as discussed earlier, and they must go back to that and not get involved again. During
his time in power, they went through a process of politicization, in order for him to promote his
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legitimacy. They were used as a means for regime sustainability, a mere mechanism used as the
Saudi king used religion, the Egyptian regime used crony capitalism through the sinister
marriage between capital and politics, and the Syrian regime portrayed itself as the last defense
line against Israel. Some tribes were favored over others, which instigated hatred and feuds and
helped in further dividing the country, which only served Qaddafi, a typical divide and conquer
strategy.
Tribes at the end of the day are well formed social networks. The Libyan government
should use these well-founded structures to promote micro-community-led reconstruction.182 A
strong potential exists at this level until the government can construct strong institutions that
are capable of uniting the people as a whole at the national and local levels.
The tribes have constructed a “phatic labor,”183 through their engagement of sociality
over the past century. It is a social infrastructure created through networking and engagement
over a long period of time that comes close to the importance of actual infrastructure in the case
of Libya. Tribal leaders have the ability to gather information about the members of their tribes
more than any public institution.184 Due to the lack of outreach by the old regime to the people
of Libya, these leaders have greater access and knowledge of the societal and economic needs
of their people than the government, particularly outside the urban centers. Working with the
tribal leaders, especially the leaders of the marginalized and poor tribes would give the
government more access and a greater understanding of the needs of society. It would also give
the government legitimacy when interacting with the extremely marginalized tribes in the
outskirts of Libya, for the tribes have filled the void left by the government in those areas for
the past four decades.
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Once there is an inclusive, equal, and well-constructed government outreach to the
tribes, tribal leaders would be more willing to use and capable of using their authority to push
their people towards reconciliation and engender hope in the government and affection towards
Libya as a whole. Tribes are quite different from each other economically and socially, which
provokes further resentment. Also, there are historical vendettas built on battles fought amongst
each other over the centuries. Having them all participate in an inclusive community-led
development fostered by the government without the marginalization of those who fought for
the Qaddafi regime and the different sides fighting in the current conflict would beget trust and
hope in the government and slowly bring the tribes’ loyalty to Libya as their nation rather than
having loyalties to the tribe alone.
Conclusion

The government, international developmental organizations and donors must focus on social
reforms and reconciliation in Libya. The situation has reached a boiling point that seriously
threatens the unity of Libya. Government, international finance and expertise must target
community-based development at the micro level to bring the people together. They must use
the existing traditional social units such as the tribes to better reach the people on the ground.
They must be used until the government achieves institutional development that can foster the
participation of citizens and include both the victors and the losers in the war. Community-led
development supported by the government through the building of strong local institutions and
non-government actors that can reach the people and communicate their demands and fears to
the government while being active and equal participants in the developmental process would
be the lifeline needed to support Libya through the upcoming difficult years.
It is no surprise that the nation is engulfed in such turmoil: nations with high corruption
and inequality levels post-conflict are prone to face conflict again.185 Inclusion and
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reconciliation efforts from the government were weak, due to the lack of proper institutions.
International organizations and the new government worked on constructing the political and
economic mechanisms, despite the social crisis and divisions within the different sectors of
society. There was little or no encouragement for the community to play a part in the
reconstruction efforts. Huge segments of society were marginalized and local institutions
lacked the financial support or legal legitimacy to apply community-led development and reach
out to their people directly.186The international focus was directed towards bringing oil exports
back to the global market rather than putting people back on their feet.187
If Libya does not survive this current turmoil and turns into a military state once more,
all will be lost. However, if democracy prevails in this current conflict, it needs to learn a
lesson and become a functional one. There must be inclusion and encouragement of
participation. Community-led development has proven to be a crucial step towards these goals;
thus, it has to be capitalized on in the future.

Limitations and Areas for Further Research
Many difficulties were faced in this research, and the greatest was the lack of sources and data
about Libya, especially Libyan-made literature. All three periods covered in this research
suffered from this. Not much had been written about the period of the monarchy, especially by
Libyan writers for the Qaddafi regime was keen on painting a picture of the time that
diminished the accomplishments of the monarchy and labeled it as period of corruption and
betrayal of Libya for the benefit of western powers.188 The majority of Libyan resources that
cover this period and the development of its institutions and identity creation were written by
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exiled members of the opposition or after the fall of Qaddafi. As for the second period covered
here, which is the forty-two years of the Jamahirya, not much was available in terms of data
and field research since Libyan institutions did not have the ability or permission to do such
things. Much of the available Libyan literature was propaganda by the regime or written by
Libyans living outside or foreigners who did not have access to reliable data. Since these
institutions carried on after the fall of the regime and Libya was more or less stuck in crisis
management mode till the outbreak of the current conflict, not much had been added to the
existing body of literature. Finding reliable sources was a very difficult part of this research and
finding data was impossible, which caused the focus on mostly qualitative rather than
quantitative material. The in-depth interviews conducted with members of the government,
academia, civil society, and the tribal system were done to make up for the unavailability of
such quantitative sources.
The fieldwork portion of this research was conducted in February 2016 in the cities of
Misurata and Tripoli in the west of Libya. It could not be conducted in Benghazi during that
time, due to the fighting that was taking place there, which caused a severe lack of security. To
be as inclusive as possible, finding people from the east who moved into the west due to the
conflict was a priority in the selection of interviewees.
More time was needed to conduct interviews than the two weeks used here. The
interviewees were eager to participate and were eager to recommend others in order to enrich
the research. The original plan was to interview seven to ten people, but over twenty were
interviewed due to the help of the originally contacted interviewees. More could have been
interviewed if time had allowed. Researchers desiring to conduct such interviews are
recommended to plan an ample amount of time to do so. It is hard to get in touch with
interesting interviewees and focus group subjects from outside Libya, but they can easily be
contacted once the reviewer is there.
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